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ABSTRACT

The Rwandan Genocide occurred between April and July of 1994. Within those four
months, approximately a million Tutsi were brutally murdered by the Hutu in an effort to cleanse
the country of a Tutsi presence. The genocide was the culmination of decades of unrest between
the two groups created from Western influence under colonialism and post-colonial
relationships. The international response to the genocide was scarce. While international
intervention waned, the international media kept the genocide relevant in its publications. This
thesis examines print media sources from the United States, Britain, and France. This thesis
argues that the reporting of the genocide exacerbated larger issues concerning the relationship
between the West and Africa. The journalists perpetuated Western superiority over Africa by
utilizing racism to preserve colonial ideologies and stereotypes of Africans. In turn, this inherent
Western racism complicated the implementation of human rights legislation that would have
helped save Tutsi lives. This thesis places the Rwandan genocide, through the reports of Western
media, into the larger historiographic context of the Western African dichotomy.
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INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHIC CONTEXT

On the evening of 6 April 1994, unknown perpetrators shot down the plane carrying the
president of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, over Kigali, the capital of the country. In the
following four months, between April and July of 1994, roughly 800,000 to one million innocent
people lost their lives.1 This was not a sporadic outburst of violence, it did not stem from one
plane crash. Rather, the Hutu majority had previously organized and planned attacks on the Tutsi
in an effort to eradicate all Tutsi presence from the country. Within those four months, bands of
Hutu extremists systematically hunted and murdered Tutsi civilians. These Hutu soldiers forced
other Hutu to turn against neighbors, friends, and often times their own family, in an effort to
cleanse the inyenzi2 problem within Rwanda. And when fellow Hutu refused to partake in the
violence, or sought to help the Tutsi victims, the Hutu militias tortured and murdered them. The
situation in Rwanda during the summer of 1994 rose to the level of genocide.3
Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, commander of the UN peacekeeping force in
Rwanda during the time of the genocide described Rwanda as “a stinking nightmare of rotting
corpses, a nightmare we all had to negotiate every day.”4 The hundred day genocide which took
place was atrocious and, at times, unfathomable. But what makes the Rwandan genocide even
more horrific was that it took place in view of the international community. The perpetrators of
the torture and killing did not hide their actions behind walls or in forests; the violence took
place on the streets and in neighborhoods. The violence took place in view of journalists and
1

Estimates vary. The estimates here are taken from Linda Melvern’s A People Betrayed and Daniela Kroslak’s The
French Betrayal of Rwanda.
2
A Kinyarwanda word meaning “cockroach” used by the Hutu to describe the Tutsi.
3
In this work, the term genocide reflects the scholarly works used as a basis for this analysis. My understanding of
the term genocide is largely based on Raphael Lempkin’s definition of the term. See Samantha Power, “A Problem
from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide 42-45.
4
Dallaire, Romeo. Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, 1.
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television news crews. The small contingent of UN peacekeepers that remained in the country
throughout the four months reported daily to the United Nations and world powers. Yet, the
international leadership made little to no effort to end the killing, often getting too bogged down
in bureaucratic misgivings and personal agendas. Humanity failed Rwanda during the summer of
1994, and the consequences of that failure came at the costs of human life.

The Media and the International Community
The Rwandan genocide is unique in the sense that it was not hidden out of the sight of the
international community. The genocide took place in the streets of Rwanda, in villages and at
roadblocks. And the media was present during the entire genocide. News crews broadcasted the
violence to television screens around the world. All major countries featured news articles and
news programming during the duration of the genocide. Print media covered the genocide daily
in the West. This media coverage made the inaction of the international community even more
appalling. The most powerful countries in the world knew the severity of the situation, and still
did not take the appropriate actions to help the victims.
This analysis focuses on the press from France, Great Britain, and the United States. I
chose these three countries because they represent major players on the world stage and all three
hold permanent places on the Security Council of the United Nations. These countries had the
power to provide relief in Rwanda, but, unfortunately, became hindrances rather than help.
Another important reason these countries are focused on is their former position as colonial
powers. All three countries previously held territories and controlled countries, especially in
Africa, throughout the past two centuries. All three believed in the exportability of their

2

respective cultures and societal structures.5 France, the US, and Britain all played an important
role in the development of Africa both under colonialism and in the years following
decolonization.
This thesis focuses on one major daily paper and one weekly periodical from each of the
three countries. From France, I chose, Le Monde, a daily left-wing paper published in Paris, and
L’Express, a Parisian weekly periodical that tends to be right wing. Both French periodicals have
high circulation within France, and have counterparts in other countries. From the United States,
I chose The New York Times, a daily paper of record that is the second highest circulated
newspaper within the country, and Time, a weekly magazine published in New York that is the
most highly circulated news magazine worldwide. The two British periodicals chosen were, The
Times, a traditionally moderate daily paper published in London, and The Economist, an Englishlanguage weekly periodical published in London that claims to take an editorial stance on social
and economic liberalism.
While all of these press sources shared the genocide to the world, to think of them as
monolithic is troublesome. Even to think of a singular country’s press media being cohesive is
problematic. These sources differ in political affiliation, national influence, and targeted
objectives. Just like their countries of origin, the reporters of these selected sources, had different
understandings of Rwanda and vendettas concerning intervention and international
responsibility. In a study of media, the exclusivity of each media source is important.
This thesis does not argue against the distinctiveness of the sources, but it does argue that
among that uniqueness, larger commonalities arose. The reporters did not always agree on
distinct issues concerning the genocide. Their views on intervention varied throughout the four
5

Newsome, David D. The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World. Indiana
University Press, 2001, 30-36.
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months as well as their stances on the actions of other world powers and how to accurately
define the situation in Rwanda. But, spanning all three countries, the press perpetuated larger
themes. The press from all three countries exacerbated the legacies of colonialism and the
complications of human rights legislation.
But the reporters went further than that. In the reporting of the Rwandan genocide, the
reporters highlighted the troublesome relationship between the West and Africa. Hundreds of
years of Western exploration and colonialism of the African continent created a system of
Western superiority over Africans. Historically, the Western “image” of Africa is a fictive one.
The West sees Africans as backward, non-industrialized, and destitute. Essentially, Africans are
non-European.6 This influenced and continues to influences the West’s perceptions and
interpretations of African conflict and construction of Africans themselves. And, in a Western
world that rebukes racism, the press coverage during the Rwandan genocide came to perpetuate
racial stereotypes created by this dichotomy. While the Western media outright acknowledged
the West’s influence and liability for the genocide, they also made the genocide the fault of the
Rwandans ostensibly because of underlying racial inferiorities. The reporters separated
themselves from the colonial ideologies unequivocally, yet perpetuated the racism they claimed
to reject.
This inherent racism ingrained within Western reporters complicated the issues of
intervention and culpability concerning adherence to human rights legislation. Rwandans were
victims ostensibly because of their innate inferiority yet also connaturally perpetrators of their
own genocide. For the reporters, this made application of human rights legislation nearly
impossible to discern. In turn, this led the media to shift the focus away from Rwanda itself and
6

Nwaubani, Ebere. The United States and Decolonization in West Africa 1950-1960. New York: University of
Rochester Press, 2001, 50.
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use the genocide as a scapegoat for denunciation of international world powers and the United
Nations as a whole. The innocent victims of the genocide got lost in the media shuffle of
castigation of international foreign policy concerning human rights violations.

Historiography
Though the Rwandan genocide is less than twenty years old, the amount of literature on
the subject is extensive. Scholars began writing on the genocide immediately after it ended.
There was a need for the international community to come to terms with what had just happened
but more importantly what they just let happen. In the past two decades, the work published has
come from many different facets of the scholarly world. Historians, journalists, political
scientists, and anthropologists, have published works regarding the genocide. Out of this work,
the historiography of the genocide has a few discernable trends.
One major trend that developed in the historiography was how colonial rule created the
condition for the genocide. Within this trend of the historiography, historians such as Frederick
Cooper,7 Gerard Prunier,8 and Mamhood Mamdani9 argue that European colonialism created the
relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Belgian rule of Rwanda institutionalized a
hierarchical system, creating Tutsi superiority over the Hutu majority. This solidification of
societal roles led to the inherency of tension between the two groups, resulting in genocide in
1994. Another major trend in the historiography of the genocide is the history of the memory and
commemoration of the genocide. Many works, such as those from journalist Philip Gourevitch10

7

Cooper, Frederick. Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Prunier, Gerard. The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
9
Mamdani, Mamhood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001.
10
Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from
Rwanda. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998.
8
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and Jennie Burent,11 use interviews and testimonies to portray the genocide from a personal
level. The third major trend focuses on culpability. This trend questions and blames the
international community for their actions and inactions during the genocide. Historians such as
Alain Destexhe12 and Linda Melvern,13 focus on the role of the West and their lack of
intervention and refusal to acknowledge the situation as genocide. Other historians, such as
Daniela Kroslak14 and Samantha Power,15 provide critical studies into specific Western countries
and their relationships to the genocide.
These three trends -the colonial influence, memory and commemoration, and culpabilityrun throughout the historiography of the Rwandan genocide. While media is used by many of the
authors as a minor part of their individual arguments, there has not been an in-depth analysis of
the media’s perceptions. This thesis is intended to fill this gap by examining the reporting of the
Rwandan Genocide by the media in France, Britain, and the United States in order to show how
the reporters appropriated the language of Rwanda’s colonial past and the provisions of modern
day human rights legislation to make sense of the genocide to an incredulous public. This thesis
will argue that the reporters not only embodied Rwanda’s colonial legacy, as they crafted their
narrative in the context of the “other,” but they also used that legacy to apportion blame and
assign responsibility for non-intervention in Rwanda. And, in so doing, the reporters became
embroiled in interpreting confusing human rights legislation to the international community.
Ultimately, the reporting suggests that instead of taking action against the perpetrators of the

11

Burnet, Jennie E. Genocide Lives in Us: Women, Memory, and Silence in Rwanda. The University of Wisconsin
Press, 2012.
12
Destexhe, Alain. Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Translated by Alison Marschner. New York:
New York University Press, 1995.
13
In both, Melvern, Linda. A People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide. London: Zed Books,
2000. And Melvern, Linda. Conspiracy to Murder: Planning the Rwandan Genocide. London: Verso, 2004.
14
Kroslak, Daniela. The French Betrayal of Rwanda. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2008.
15
Power, Samantha. “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide.” New York: Basic Books, 2002.
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Rwandan Genocide, Britain, France and the United States, in varying degrees, were more
preoccupied with blaming each other, and the United Nations.
But, this thesis will also contribute to the historiography in a larger way. This thesis
integrates the Rwandan genocide in the larger context of the Western world. This thesis argues
that the reporting of the genocide exemplified the larger issues concerning racism and the
legacies of colonialism coming from the West. In turn, this inherent Western racism complicated
the ability and willingness for Western intervention during the genocide. This thesis adds to the
historiography by demonstrating how the genocide itself was more than just a product of
European colonialism; the lack of intervention was also a product of the legacy of Western
racism toward Africans. While individual Western nations had their own personal relationships
with Rwanda, the media sources studied proved that monolithic Western views were overarching
concerning the Rwandan genocide.

Chapter Breakdown
This thesis will break down into three different chapters, each analyzing a different aspect
of the news media from France, Britain, and the United States. The first chapter will focus on
how colonialism and neocolonialism shaped the media’s outlook on the Rwandan genocide. This
chapter will show how Rwanda’s colonial legacy created the conditions that engendered the
genocide, and how the media used these legacies to interpret the events of the genocide. This
chapter contends that the language of colonialism is not only entrenched in Western culture but
also conditioned how reporters presented the genocide to the international community. I argue
that the reporters perpetuated colonial ideologies and language, therefore becoming part of the
larger colonial narrative and reinforcing the dichotomy between the West and Africa.

7

The second chapter argues that the reporters, as an ingrained product of the legacies of
colonialism, used the genocide to allot blame and accredit responsibility to France, Britain, the
United States, and the United Nations. This chapter examines why the media from certain
countries felt more of a responsibility to intervene, such as France, but also why others decided
to remain uninvolved, such as the case of the United States. This chapter also focuses heavily on
the United Nations as a whole entity. The media from all three countries used the United Nations
as a source of blame in order to shift individual responsibility onto the larger collective body. I
argue that the reporters focused on allocating blame and responsibility, overshadowing reporting
the actual abomination of the genocide, because they did not fully understand the situation in
Rwanda.
The third and final chapter focuses on the medias’ use of language, most importantly, the
use of the word ‘genocide.’ This chapter opines that the term ‘genocide’ comes along with
obligation of the international community to intervene based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. This chapter breaks the media down into two categories, one that was not afraid
to use the term and the other that shied away from calling the situation in Rwanda by that name.
This chapter argues that the interaction between these two stances of the media represents the
larger problems with human rights theory and interpretation of international human rights
legislation. This final chapter demonstrates the challenges the international community faced
with the Rwandan genocide through analyzing those complexities on the smaller scale of the
media.

8

CHAPTER ONE: THE COLONIAL LEGACY OF GENOCIDE
The genocide in Rwanda had its roots in European colonialism. Colonialism shaped
relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi and solidified a system of distrust and animosity
between the two groups. The reporting of the genocide in France, Britain, and the United States
recognized the effects of colonialism in Rwanda. Reporters used the colonial legacy of the
country to help make sense of what was going on during the genocide. Reporters also used
Rwanda’s colonial legacy to place blame and demand that European countries that once ruled
Rwanda intervene. But, the media also utilized the colonial history of Rwanda to attack and
criticize former European colonizers and their colonial relationship with Rwanda, as well as their
neo-colonial relationship that formed after decolonization.
The media did not just present a colonial history of Rwanda; it focused heavily on the
mutual antagonism between the Hutu and the Tutsi that dated back to the period of Belgian
colonialism. The reporters themselves also became a part of the colonial narrative. The reports
from Western news media reinforced colonial ideologies and the idea of “otherness” through
their word choice and descriptions. The reporting takes on the “us versus them” mentality16 in
which the West dominates Africa and the rest of the Third World. It is reminiscent of what
Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler describe as the need for the “otherness” of the colonized
person to be defined and maintained.17 The three Western countries analyzed all played a role in
colonialism and that experience caused a “unique coherence and a special cultural centrality.”18

16

Said, Culture and Imperialism, xxiii
Cooper and Stoler, Tensions of Empire, 7.
18
Said, Culture and Imperialism, xxii
17

9

The reporters of the genocide were part of this larger colonial narrative, whether they were
consciously aware of it or not. The reporters perpetuated the racism that they claimed to reject.
Colonial legacies refers to the byproducts of colonialism left over from the colonial
period. Historian Frederick Cooper explains that the separation between what is considered
“colonial” and “post-colonial” cannot be thought of as a definitive break. When colonialism
officially ended, institutions and ideologies remained in place even as the colonizer left. New
African governments simply inherited colonial enactments and conceptions with no significant
change.19 Here, these “legacies” are in part a continuation of colonial constructs, most
importantly in this analysis, the continuation of racial separation of the Hutu and the Tutsi
established under Belgian rule.
Within post-colonial Rwanda, the racialization of the Hutu and the Tutsi did not end
when the Belgians left. Historian Mamhood Mamdani argues that racialization between the two
groups was much more than an intellectual construct. Under colonial rule, racialization and
separation became institutionalized.20 The Belgians created economic, political, and social
differences that remained in post-colonial Rwanda. The laws set in place by the Belgians in order
to solidify Hutu and Tutsi differences survived and continued to spark racial tensions between
the Hutu and the Tutsi after Rwanda gained independence. It is this legacy, the legacy of
institutionalized racism left from Belgian colonization, which fuels the argument presented here.
Another important issue essential to this argument is the role of neo-colonialism. Kwame
Nkrumah, former leader of Ghana and its predecessor state the Gold Coast, states that neocolonialism represents imperialism in its “final and perhaps most dangerous state.” In essence,
neo-colonialism suggests that the State is theoretically independent and maintains all of the

19
20

Cooper, Africa Since 1940, 4.
Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 87.
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benefits of international sovereignty. But, in reality, the State’s economic system and
consequently its political policies are actually controlled from the outside.21 Neo-colonial
powers thereby control governments and regimes through monetary support. Therefore these
powers continue to maintain control over governments and regimes since they require economic
help in order to keep the country going. In most cases of neo-colonialism, the power in control of
the State is usually the former colonial ruler of the area. For Rwanda, however, this is not the
case.
Rwanda’s main source of outside economic assistance was not from their former
colonizer, Belgium, but rather from France. This neo-colonial aid and economic support from
France caused many issues when genocide broke out in 1994 and put France in a very precarious
place on the world stage. Historian Daniela Kroslak examines the French role in Rwanda in her
work and illustrates how the French controlled the Rwandan government by making economic
aid available only through democratization.22 The promise of French aid molded how Rwanda
grew out of colonization. The neo-colonialism of Rwanda by the French is essential to this
argument and in understanding the dynamic between the Western world and Rwanda during the
1994 genocide.

The Rise of European Colonialism and Colonial Legacy in Rwanda
European thinkers throughout the nineteenth century perpetuated racial ideology through
their writings and influenced the way that European society saw and understood the colonized.
Early on, beginning in the eighteenth century, many European thinkers used physical differences
to justify Western superiority. They argued that phrenology and physiognomy helped determine

21
22

Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, ix.
Kroslak, The French Betrayal of Rwanda, 3.
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self-worth and an individual’s ability to be civilized. According to this model, many
phrenologists concluded that Africans were innately uncivilizable due to undeveloped brain
organs and therefore were considered “savages.”23 Explorers and cartographers on the African
continent perpetuated these views through their stories and writings in order to justify the
manipulation of Africans to achieve their goals and get what they wanted.24 This early form of
separation and idea of uncivilizability continued into the nineteenth century with the rise of
colonialism and helped perpetuate European domination of Africa.
The rise of the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
the rise of eugenics, and improvements in technology in parts of Europe and America created a
gap between industrialized Europe and the colonial world, especially Africa. Historian Michael
Adas claimed “African cultures were merely manifestations of the vast gap in evolutionary
development that separated ‘civilized’ Europe from ‘savage’ Africa”25 during the time that
Europe was industrializing. Adas states that travelers’ accounts of the “rude and primitive” tools
of Africans reminiscent of the Stone Age in comparison to the new technology surfacing in
Europe coincided with the beliefs of the time that Africa was indeed “primitive and savage.”26
Europeans at the time believed that they were millennia ahead of Africans due to reports from
those Europeans that worked within Africa or had contact with the continent. At that time, this
vast difference technologically between Europeans and Africans helped perpetuate the idea of
Africans being savage. European superiority dictated that Africans were their “savage inferiors.”

23

Staum, Labeling People, 63.
Staum, Labeling People, 188.
25
Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 164.
26
Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 164
24
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As technology and scientific discovery spread throughout the European continent,
colonial administrators began to use this as a basis for comparison.27 Scientific achievement
replaced physical difference when it came to racial theory.28 Because Africans were not as
technologically or scientifically advanced at the time, they were thereby inferior and justifiably
in a position to be dominated by advanced Europe. Stories and writings from the mid-nineteenth
century helped spread racial ideology throughout the Western world and cemented European
racial attitudes. Even today, these “often corrupted and vulgarized, invariably oversimplified
and sensationalized … ideas have played a major role from the nineteenth century to the present
in shaping popular attitudes in Europe and North America toward African and Asian peoples and
cultures.”29 The reports from France, Britain, and the United States during the Rwandan
genocide in 1994 reflect these centuries’ old views and demonstrate how Western ideology and
theory still play a prominent role in Western thought today when it comes to the African
continent.
The British and French have a long and well-known history of imperialism throughout
Africa and the rest of the world that lasted for centuries. But, often times, the United States is not
referred to as an imperial power among conversations of colonialism. Yet, this thesis uses the
United States as an avenue to examine Western colonialism concerning Rwanda. With the
acquisition of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War in 1898,
the United States officially became a colonial power. It was the first time in American history
that the United States did not seek to make newly obtained territory into states. Acquiring foreign

27

Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 144.
Staum, Labeling People, 87.
29
Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 153.
28
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colonies, the United States expanded the idea of Manifest Destiny past just the North American
continent.30
But concerning Africa, the United States played a different type of imperial role. At the
end of World War II, American diplomacy became focused on maneuvering for power in the
new international system. The reconfiguration of Africa coincided with the United States’
emergence as a superpower; therefore, the United States needed to be a part of the African
continent. This need to expand interest into Africa also coincided with the formulation of
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States needed to have some
sort of influence in Africa in order to legitimize international power.31
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the United States took a minimalistic
approach to Africa, but still sought to have enough influence in order to remain relevant on the
world stage. But doing that was not easy in practice. Officially, the United States sought to
reform rather than preserve minority regimes, yet, American political process did just that,
complicating the American position within the continent. Racial problems in the United States at
home muddled the situation even more, with the end of the Jim Crow era and the emanation of
the civil rights movement.32 But the United States still remained influential toward new African
governments and emerging power structures, even if they did not play as large of a role as
Britain and France, therefore constituting them as a colonial power for the purpose of this thesis.
And, like Britain and France, racial prejudices heavily influenced perceptions of Africa by the
United States that extended into 1994 and the Rwandan genocide.

30

Manifest Destiny refers to the 19th century American belief that settlers were destined to expand throughout the
North American continent.
31
Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa 1950-1960, 31.
32
Newsome, David D. The Imperial Mantle, 159.
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In order to understand how colonial legacy played into the reporting of the genocide, it is
necessary to focus on the colonial history of Rwanda and the role it played in the relationship
between the Hutu and the Tutsi. When the first explorers reached Rwanda, they were surprised to
find that the people of the country appeared homogeneous; they shared the same language,33 the
same religion,34 and had no distinct segregations in society even though the population divided
itself into three groups. Prior to colonization, in the late nineteenth century, ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’
appear to have little political significance; they were merely identifiers.35 These identities in precolonial Rwanda were fluid. Larger factors played into political identity in pre-colonial Rwanda,
such as language, kin groups, and marriage. Culture influenced political identity.36 But political
identity in pre-colonial Rwanda did not equate to polarized identities that occurred under
colonial rule.
The economic community of pre-colonial Rwanda is an example of how colonialism
helped define and divide the Hutu and the Tutsi. One notion of the pre-colonial economic
structure of Rwanda was that the Hutu were agriculturalists and the Tutsi were pastoralists.
Essentially, Tutsi brought cattle to Rwanda when they settled. But, Mamhood Mamdani refutes
that notion of separation. According to him, both Hutu and Tutsi carried out agricultural and
pastoral activities in most regions. And many Hutu owned and raised cattle before the arrival of
the Tutsi. Mamdani warns that by dividing the pre-colonial Hutu and Tutsi along such strict lines

33

Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 5.
Melvern, A People Betrayed, 7.
35
Newbury, Catharine, The Cohesion of Oppression, 10.
36
Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 51-56. Mamdani argues that the Hutu and the Tutsi both derived from
the same language, though they had different names. Also, during pre-colonial Rwanda, cohabitation and marriage
changed a person from one identifier to another. For instance, the child of a Tutsi father, is a Tutsi even if the mother
is a Hutu. The Hutu and the Tutsi also recognized patrilineal kin groups, eighteen major clans in total. which
included Hutu and Tutsi, and the Twa.
34
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demonstrates “a division enforced through the medium of political power rather than the timeless
preoccupation of two separate groups of people.”37
The pre-colonial power structure of Rwanda was quite intricate on the eve of European
rule. While basically feudal, there was a central administrative system that consisted of four
levels: province, district, hill, and neighborhood.38 The Germans were the first Europeans to
come to Rwanda and established colonial rule after the Colonial Conference in Berlin in the mid
1880s. Arriving in 1892, they came at a very crucial time in Rwanda’s pre-colonial history.39
The king had just died, and there was no clear heir to the throne. The Rwandans manipulated the
Germans easily in the fight for the throne that ensued as soon as they got there.40 They
established a policy of indirect rule that supported the Rwandan chiefs, which helped deepen
their faithfulness to the Germans.41 With this policy of indirect rule, the Germans began the
colonial influence on the Hutu and Tutsi relationship. According to historian Rene Lemarchand,
“in Rwanda the very success of indirect rule reinforced the absolutism of the monarchy, and
hence the hegemony of the ruling caste.”42 The Rwandan monarchy, now with German support,
continued pre-colonial policies that annexed the Hutu principalities and increased chiefly power
of the Tutsi.43 While German rule may have inaugurated the artificial divisions of Hutu and Tutsi
identification, their rule was short-lived.
The First World War ended the short German rule in Rwanda; Belgian troops entered the
country on 6 May 1916.44 Under Belgian rule, racialization became an institutional construct.45
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The Belgians saw the Tutsi as the superior race in Rwanda because of their “European-like”
features. Prejudice became deeply rooted in administrative policy.46 In 1926, the Belgians
“streamlined” the structure of local government and the power of the chiefs shifted to local
authorities. The system of joint power, where Hutu and Tutsi shared equal responsibility, was
abolished. Power was given to a single agent, which happened to almost always be a Tutsi.47 By
the end of Belgian rule, in 1959, forty-three out of forty-five chiefs were Tutsi.48
To have better control, the Belgians established race education. Western style schools
opened under the Belgians that taught that Tutsi were racially superior. Schools also became
segregated. The schools admitted both Hutu and Tutsi children but the level of education given
to each group was drastically different. Tutsi children received standard European education in
French while the Hutu children received an inferior education. The point of the Hutu education
was to merely prepare them for manual labor and to indoctrinate them to believe that common
citizenship was not meant for the Hutu even if they were educated.49 The legacy of colonial
education was still evident during the time of the genocide. Belgian author, Omer Marchal noted
in 1994, “’the majority of the Tutsi could read, but did not want to vote. The Hutu would all have
liked to vote, but only a minority could read.’” He blamed this on the fact that Hutu parents
found school to be useless while Tutsi parents pushed their children to pursue a good
education.50
While the Belgians fully enforced Tutsi supremacy, how to determine who was Hutu and
who was Tutsi was still difficult. Because of this, the Belgians decided in 1933 to instate identity
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cards and a national census.51 Ironically, the Belgians themselves had to systematize a definition
of what was Hutu and what was Tutsi. Physically, the Hutu and the Tutsi varied. But even
physical aspects changed from region to region and person to person. Finally, the 1933-34 census
identified the Tutsi as separate from the Hutu according to a ten-cow rule: whoever owned ten or
more cows was classified as a Tutsi. Hutu and Tutsi identities became legal after that census,
and everyone was given an identity card.52 The installment of identity cards in the 1930s had a
direct impact on the genocide six decades later. Identity cards helped the Hutu militias identify
Tutsi at roadblocks during the genocide.53
Belgian rule in Rwanda established Hutu and Tutsi identity and these identities continued
until the end of Belgian rule in 1962. The Tutsi now equated power and the Hutu, subject.54
While Rwanda was not devoid of tensions between the two groups before the arrival of
Europeans, no trace of violence based purely upon ethnic lines appeared between Hutu and Tutsi
in pre-colonial history.55 Violent conflict did not usually pit Hutu against Tutsi, but rather rival
kingdoms that consisted of both groups of people.56 The Belgians destroyed the complex and
integrated pre-colonial society and in its place placed a regimented and segregated Europeanmade society that instilled values within Rwandans that would affect their relationships with
each other throughout the rest of the twentieth century.
The Second World War brought change to Rwanda as it did for much of Africa. The
democratization of post-war Europe also affected Rwanda. Europe exported the idea of majority
rule rather than elite rule to Rwanda and it spread throughout the country. This new rule
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supported Hutu power since they constituted the majority of the country. The Belgians, with
pressure from the UN, began to realize that their old ways of ruling, with the Tutsi minority,
were outdated and Hutu public life began to slowly improve.57 Throughout the 1950s, the Hutu
created political parties and attempted to garner more support from the Belgians and the Church,
both inside Rwanda and from the international community.58 Hutus rallied around the idea that
Tutsi invaders enslaved the Hutu and stole power from them as they overran the country.59 In
1957, the Hutu created the “Hutu Manifesto” that blamed the Tutsi for monopolizing land,
power, and education.60 The tension continually built throughout the end of the decade between
the now powerful Hutu and the cast aside Tutsi.
Finally the powder keg exploded. The trigger was an alleged assault on a Hutu sub-chief
by a Tutsi in November 1959. By the end of 1964, thousands were dead, and over 300,000 had
fled Rwanda and were refugees in neighboring countries. In 1960, the PARMEHUTU, the
largest Hutu political party, won their first election, and abolished the monarchy. The Hutu
Revolution was complete.61 During this whole process, the Belgians supported the Tutsi
minority, yet the Hutu revolution would not have happened so smoothly without Belgian help
and support. Lemarchand states “The Hutu revolution was a long and painful experience, which
may no have succeeded without the auxiliary support extended by the Belgian administration to
the insurgents.”62 The revolution not only left the political identities created under colonialism in
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place but reinforced them. It was due to the colonial impetus and the solidification of identity
that the Hutu felt repressed enough to launch a major and violent revolution.63
Rwanda was officially granted independence on 1 July 1962.64 While many Rwandans
sought independence from colonial rule, many Tutsi feared that, as the minority, they might be
threatened by the Hutu majority, the victors of the elections. The Hutu, on the other hand, feared
that the Tutsi were conspiring against the Hutu to try and take back power by ignoring free
elections.65 Directly after the Hutu took control of the country following independence a period
of calm took place. But the ethnic question became more acute during the early 1970s under
President Kayibanda. The Kayibanda regime installed quotas that limited jobs and education to
the Tutsi. Competition for those elusive spots exacerbated racial tension throughout the country
until Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew Kayibanda in 1973.66
After Kayibanda, Rwandans and the outside world saw Habyarimana as a moderate
leader.67 While Habyarimana brought peace and stability to the country, his iron-fisted rule
cannot be over looked. Outside of the communist world, Rwanda was probably the most
controlled state in the world. Habyarimana’s regime was no doubt totalitarian; where the state
required everyone to carry ID cards in order to strictly regulate travel.68 The peace and stability
did not mean complete ideological liberation of the Tutsi. Tutsi still faced racial discrimination
and legal exclusion, but, for the most part, everyday life for the Tutsi was quite tolerable.69 It was
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clear, however, that the “ethnic distortions” installed by the Belgians and the Germans were
“seemingly enshrined in the psyche of Rwanda.”70
During Habyarimana’s rule, he tried to open Rwanda to the outside world both politically
and economically. From 1979 forward, he participated in the Franco-African summits and
cofounded the Economic Community of the Great Lakes, or the CEPGL.71 France became one of
the closest foreign allies to the Habyarimana regime and Rwanda became part of the
Francophone world. Slowly, France replaced Belgium as the largest foreign supporter of
Rwanda. French president Francois Mitterand and Juvenal Habyarimana even considered each
other personal friends.72 The close relationship between the two leaders however, masked the
neo-colonial, dependent relationship between France and Rwanda. To be sure, France continued
to use socio-economic, political, and military aid to maintain influence and control, thus
contributing to the outbreak of the violence that alimented in the genocide.
The 1990 civil war that ended in the genocide of 1994, discussed in the introduction, built
itself upon this long, intricate history of Rwanda. Years of European racial indoctrination and
involvement resulted in the death of nearly a million innocent Tutsi and moderate Hutu within a
period of only four months. The news media from the United States, Great Britain, and France
all use this colonial legacy in their reports of the genocide.

The Colonial Legacy and Western Perceptions of Africa
The reporters in France, Britain, and the United States all used the colonial and neocolonial legacies of Rwanda and Africa during the time of the genocide in order to help the
public understand why the civil war and genocide were taking place. The media focused on
70
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Belgium and France mostly, due to their colonial and neo-colonial relationships with Rwanda.
The news media mainly used the Belgian colonial legacy to explain the hatred between the Hutu
and the Tutsi. The real criticism of the Belgians by the media came only after the Belgians
withdrew from Rwanda shortly after the genocide started. The news media always justified their
withdrawal, though they were one of the most likely candidates to give aid within their former
colony, because of their loss of men in the first week of the genocide.73
The Belgian colonial influence is mentioned in the media from all three countries as the
reason for the violence between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Rwanda was the “case study in what
happens to a former colony when suppressed tribal rivalries are released into a power vacuum.”74
The New York Times mentions the Belgian colonial influence as early as 9 April,75 and an article
from 11 July goes more in depth by describing the Belgians classification system and their
implementation of identity cards.76 It is stressed that these identity cards put in place under
colonial rule were still in use during the time of the genocide and were helping many Hutu
militia identify, and thus kill, Tutsi.77 For reporters of Time, “the legacy of Belgian rule all but
guaranteed the violence that has erupted.”78 The Economist reports also acknowledged that
“Ethnic and political hostility are inseparably entwined in Rwanda’s history”79 due to Belgian
influence. The Belgian colonial influence perpetuated the violence that took place in 1994
according to the news media.
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The press used the institutional racialization of Rwanda by the Belgians to demonstrate
the legacy of Belgian colonialism. On 18 June, The Times told readers that the Hutu were able to
get ordinary citizens to kill their neighbors because “racial ideology is almost certainly what
transformed the crisis into full-scale genocide.”80 The French media also understood that “racial
hatred was developed, distilled by those who wanted power or to conquer,”81 and established that
the country’s colonial history and racialization by Europeans caused it to be a “powder-keg.”82 In
essence, the news media recognized that “the otherness of colonized persons was neither inherent
nor stable; his or her difference had to be defined and maintained.”83 The history of Belgian
colonial rule in Rwanda is used as the primary context of the problem between the Hutu and the
Tutsi and gave understanding to why the killing is going on.
The news media used racial reasoning in an attempt to understand how Europe viewed its
former colonial territory. Former colonial powers were not coming to the aid of Rwanda and this
“intensifies suspicion that the white West’s refusal to come to the aid of black Africa is racist”84
according to American journalist Marguerite Michaels. A 7 May article from The Economist uses
race to understand why there was no intervention happening by former colonial powers. “The
world did not want to know. Rwanda was too difficult, too remote, too black.”85 The American
media criticized the British racial reasoning for not getting involved. “Rwandans are thousands
of miles away. Nobody you know has ever been on holiday to Rwanda. And Rwandans don’t
look like us.”86 The French media took the racial aspect to a visual level as well. Many cartoons
appearing in Le Monde featured dark black people in traditional African garb, barefoot with
80
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lavish beaded jewelry and babies on their hips while the European in the cartoon was almost
always in uniform. The over exaggeration of race in cartoons shows that the racial profiling from
colonialism still remains in the psyche of the Western reporters.
The European colonial legacy in Africa is multi-faceted within the media. The first way
the media uses European colonialism is to criticize Europe for the lack of intervention and their
initial withdrawal when they had played such a large role in the formation of present day Africa.
Many leaders in the peacekeeping mission in place in Rwanda when the genocide broke out were
surprised that the “ex-colonial white countries” would pull out their troops in the time of most
need.87 The news media followed suit. A 25 May article from The New York Times shows that
“former colonial powers are no longer willing to intervene quickly in African lands.”88 Time
continues the criticism of former colonial powers “that used to intervene regularly have devolved
responsibility.”89 Often times the media explained that it was easier and more convenient for the
West to “blame the ‘old demons of Rwanda’”90 than take responsibility for their creation.
The news media also justified this lack of intervention with the notion that Africa did not
and could not adapt to the Western model of democracy. And because of this, “Africa, in
general, and the unfortunate nation of Rwanda, has beggared Western experience and
imagination.”91 Frederick Cooper explains this inability to democratize as a result of the
distortions that came out of decolonization. African nations became “gatekeeper states”92 which
had to balance internal problems with corruption and forming new governments with “the
interface of national and world economies.”93 “It [the violence in Rwanda] is another signal to
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the West that we cannot push democracy faster than it can be assimilated.”94 The inability of
most African states, including Rwanda, to adapt to Western democracy in the years following
decolonization became a platform that the media used to understand the relationship between the
West and Rwanda.
Also, the media used the history of democratization in Rwanda to contextualize what led
to violence. “In the frenzy of democratization in Africa that gripped the continent, it included a
revision of the Constitution, the recognition of fourteen political parties, liberalization of the
press, the creation of the new national army and the formation of a broad-based government (that
is to say including the Tutsi minority).”95 And because of this difference between African nations
and the West, these problems with Rwanda’s inability to efficiently employ the Western model,
Rwanda is portrayed as “small, poor, and globally insignificant”96 and shown as a country that
has “never been strategically significant in world politics.”97 The news media used the failure of
Rwandan democratization and assimilation to Western politics, as is so with much of the rest of
Africa, after decolonization to demonstrate why former colonial powers did not willingly jump to
the aid of Rwanda when the violence broke out.
A reason for this came from the idea that Rwanda is a product of the fate of Africa98 and
“maybe we consider ethnic massacres as part of the order of things.”99 Many times the reporters
over exaggerate the reality of the genocide with the idea that Africa is doomed to violence.
Frederick Cooper offers the idea that Africa only has “two possible fates” the first being
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“dissolving into ‘tribal’ or ‘ethnic’ violence.”100 An article in L’Express questions the lack on
concern for Rwanda early on due to the pretext that “monstrous Africa, after all, is condemned
and doomed to indifference.”101 Africa is seen as a “rudderless continent, staved of democracy
and stifled by war and misrule.”102 In a 15 June article, The New York Times describes Rwanda
as “a semantic sponge to crimes against humanity.”103 An article in The Times describes the
situation in Rwanda as “a case of that classic African equilibrium: internal chaos balanced by
external philanthropy.”104 Because Rwanda is doomed to violence, a legacy left over from
decolonization, the media seemed to suggest that the West devolved responsibility of
intervention because Rwanda is simply a product of its own fate.
The Western understanding of Rwanda and its place in world politics can also be seen in
how the media framed the genocide within the context of other events going on in the world.
Often times, the Rwandan genocide took a backseat to the situation in Bosnia. The day after
President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, the President of Tanzania described Rwanda as
“a Bosnia on our doorstep.”105 Bosnia’s location in Europe and echoes of the Holocaust caused
the situation to take front-page news.106 Tiny Rwanda would not “blow Central Africa apart- as
the Balkans might Eastern Europe.”107 This media focus on Bosnia demonstrates the racial aspect
of the press coverage. Bosnia is European, while Rwanda is African. The focus on Bosnia further
racialized the media because the reporters focused more on Europeans than Africans.
Also during the genocide, the headlines revolved around another African nation. On 27
April 1994, South Africa elected Nelson Mandela president after spending twenty-seven years in
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prison under the system of apartheid. It was the first time in the history of the country that the
South African government permitted black South Africans to vote.108 The media praised South
Africa, a former British colony, and used these positive events to contrast with the genocide in
Rwanda. Rwanda and South Africa became juxtaposed in Western media.

The Legacy of the French Relationship and Neo-colonialism
After 1962, France maintained an active role on the African continent, as did a majority
of the former colonial powers. The fall of colonialism gave way to the rise of neo-colonialism in
which former colonial powers tried to transfer the reins of government to “neocolonial regimes”
in order to maintain power and control in Africa.109 France was quick to jump in and become a
neo-colonial power. They especially favored Francophone Africa to counter the rise of the
Anglo-American influence. Rwanda was among these African countries. France sought to
achieve its goal for continued influence in Rwanda, and the rest of Africa, through cultural,
economic, and military strategy. France declared verbally and in practice that it was willing to
intervene both militarily and diplomatically throughout African nations to protect its neocolonial interests.110 And Rwanda was no exception.
A large source of criticism of the genocide by the media concerned France and its
relationship with Rwanda. Throughout the Fifth Republic, France continued an “activist Africa
policy” in which France sought to forge strategic, economic, and political ties between both
former colonies and other African countries that were outside the French influence during
colonialism.111 According to Gerald Prunier, France had always “seen itself as a large hen
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followed by a docile brood of little black chicks.”112 In the years leading up to the genocide,
France was the only Western country to maintain significant military presence in Rwanda, a far
greater presence than that of the United States or the United Kingdom.113 This military presence
helped train and fund African troops and supply weapons and arms to African militias. France
poured millions of Francs into the Rwandan military. Between 1975 and 1990, the French spent
FF 5 million on the Rwandan military, and when the war with the RPF broke out in 1990, the
French spent another FF 5 million between 1990 and 1993 alone.114 In the case of Rwanda, this
French training and access to arms became useful for the Hutu during the genocide.
The close relationship with the Habyarimana regime sheds light on why the French put so
much money and effort into the Rwandan military, especially after the RPF invasion in 1990.
Part of France’s neo-colonial relationship with Rwanda centered on forming diplomatic
relationships and friendships with African leaders in order to maintain stability and control.115
This included Rwandan president, Juvenal Habyarimana. Habyarimana knew that having a close
relationship with France secured his power and position. The French helped the regime maintain
its power through political, economic, and financial support. Following the RPF invasion, France
tripled its financial support to the country in order to maintain Habyarimana’s power and
stabilize the regime.116
The French relationship with the Habyarimana regime was immediately criticized at the
beginning of the genocide by the media. France “in propping up the Rwandan regime for so
long…bears part of the blame for the current bloodbath.”117 On 9 April, just three days after
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Habyarimana’s plane crashed, a contingent of French soldiers deployed to Kigali in order to
evacuate French ambassadors but also high-ranking Rwandan officials, all of which were Hutu,
including the Habyarimana family. They were flown to Paris and given a safe haven.118 This
evacuation garnered extreme criticism from the international community and the media,
including the media from France. “However – and this is what makes this complaint particularly
embarrassing – some accomplices of crimes, were evacuated by the French army and were on
our territory a few weeks ago.” 119 The media also criticized this action by relating it to how the
French see themselves in the grand scheme of international human rights. “The ‘homeland of
human rights,’ has more fervor to smuggle the first plane of relatives of Habyariamana than to
save the personnel – Tutsi- from the embassy in Kigali… Under an unusual ‘republican
tradition’, France hosts, at a great expense, the entourage of the deceased.”120
Throughout the genocide, France appeared to stand with the other Western countries
when it came to getting involved. They did not get directly involved until mid-June under
Operation Turquoise. But, when France’s reputation was in danger, they changed their
outlook.121 Much of the criticism from the media concerning France’s past relationship with
Rwanda came with the beginning of Operation Turquoise. “Operation Turquoise has saved some
lives, but it is also shielding some of the most notorious ringleaders of the massacres.”122 During
Operation Turquoise, France constantly pledged its neutrality to the situation despite their
previous relationship with the Hutu regime. “Paris says its objective is to halt genocide, not to
take sides in tribal violence.”123 Yet, the media did not let anyone forget that France originally
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supported the murderers. “It was France that rushed in combat troops [in 1990] and artillery to
help the government.”124 Indeed, the media continually emphasized, “France, which once
supported the Government, insists that it had no military or political objectives.”125 An article in
The Times quoted the French Defense Minister François Leotard, replying to scrutiny that
Operation Turquoise was “to prevent the murder of civilians. This has nothing to do with
imperialism.”126 But the media, from all three countries continually question the French role in
Rwanda under the precedence that they can “hardly claim to be neutral”127 due to their long
relationship with the Hutu regime.
One consequence of France’s prior relationship with Rwanda that the media focused on is
how the Hutu and the Tutsi understood that relationship themselves. As Operation Turquoise
began, many Rwandans held conflicting views of the role that the French sought to play once in
the country. As the French entered the country, they found that “Rwandans have their own ideas
on what the paratroopers should do.”128 Yet, throughout the country, the French tricolor flag flew
and walls and storefronts read “Vive la France.”129 There was a difference in Tutsi perception of
the French according to the news media between the RPF and Tutsi civilians. The RPF did not
trust the French due to their history of Hutu support. “The Tutsi rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF), masters of two-thirds of the country vehemently reject any intrusion of France,
guilty in their eyes to have armed and trained the Hutu murderers.”130 They see the French as an
object of suspicion. The media continually reiterated that Paul Kagame, head of the RPF, saw
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French intervention as an attack on the RPF and its mission131 and as “a colonial exercise.”132
Also, the RPF’s opinion of the French fell into a larger theme of decolonization. Edward Said
shows how post-imperialism formed a cultural discourse of suspicion among formerly colonized
people.133 It is a distrust of the West overall, on top of France’s former relationship with
Rwanda, that drove the RPF and other Rwandans to fear French, and European, intervention and
aid.
But, in contrast with the RPF, many Tutsi saw the French as their saviors and protectors.
“The French paratroopers seemed like saviors to the 3000 Tutsi men, women and children.”134
An article in L’Express depicts Tutsi children singing upon French arrival, “‘France brings us
peace. Machetes and stakes can no longer kill.’”135 This contrast between the leaders of the RPF
and the ordinary Tutsi citizen demonstrates a contrast in ideological perception between political
and everyday life within Rwanda. Those in charge understood the significance of the French
relationship with the Hutu and how that affected the relationship between the two groups.
Meanwhile, the average Tutsi citizen did not understand this significance. A New York Times
article acknowledges this identity problem carried over from colonization in a 27 June article.
“Many villagers interviewed at the refugee camp after the massacre said they had never known
who was a Tutsi and who was a Hutu.”136 This ideological difference demonstrates how colonial
legacy still played a role in Rwanda years after decolonization.
On the other hand, the media showed how the Hutu, at least in the beginning, saw the
French as saviors to their cause. They believed that they were there to aid the Hutu militias and
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fight against the RPF, as they had previously four years ago. As the French arrived in Rwanda in
late June, under Operation Turquoise, “delighted Hutu” welcomed the French by “wearing
tricolor headbands…flying the French flag.”137 The media shows how the Hutu believed that the
French were there in order to help them fight the RPF like that had done before.
“France sees itself as a world power. And its main field of action is Africa, where it has
an important role to play because of long standing tradition – especially in French speaking
Africa.”138 Much of French policy in Africa during this time came from a desire to maintain
French status in international politics, but also as part of the Fashoda syndrome.139 France
became a “friend to a continent that is home to four times as many French-speakers as
France.”140 France’s “obsession with preserving the reach of the French language”141 became the
driving force in French African policy. The Fashoda syndrome played a role throughout France’s
relationship with Rwanda. The invasion of the rebels from Uganda, an Anglophone nation, in
1990, at the beginning of the civil war, represented Anglo-Saxon influence spreading to a
Francophone nation. The French saw the invasion as an attack on their influence within
Africa.142 During this time, “it was France that rushed in combat troops, mortars, and artillery to
help the Government.”143 Four years later, during the genocide, many reporters warn against
“underestimating the Fashoda syndrome”144 as to why the French finally intervened in Rwanda.
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The media focused on how the Fashoda syndrome played a large role in how France
dedicated itself to Rwanda, both before the genocide and during Operation Turquoise. The
British media was very vocal about the effect that Fashoda played on the French. An article in
The Economist described the importance of French cooperation with the RPF in the history of
French relations with the country since Rwanda was a “country that they have long feared would
fall into the sphere of its English-speaking neighbors.”145 The colonial history of Britain and
France still affected their relationship during the genocide and it is evident through media
portrayal of how their long history dictates how one country sees the other.
The media from all three countries used the colonial and neo-colonial legacies,
concerning the Belgians and the French, in many different ways in order to paint a picture of
what was happening in Rwanda during the four months of genocide. But colonial legacy played
another role within the media as well. The reporters and the newspapers also become part of the
colonial narrative in the discussion of Rwanda and the West.

The Colonial Legacy on the West
Colonialism and its legacy played a large role in the media by helping the reporters make
sense of the genocide, whether over exaggerated or not, for the common public. But, the
reporters use colonial legacy in another way in their reporting. The reporters became a part of the
colonial narrative with their word choice and descriptions of the genocide. Over time, the
imperial experience gained by Britain, France, and America shaped ideas about African culture
within Western discourse.146 And this is evident in the reporting of the genocide. The Western
reporters demonstrated legacies of colonialism and European racial ideology by asserting
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Western dominance over black Africa, in this case Rwanda, in their articles by their word choice
and subtle descriptions of the small African nation.
To be sure, the colonial powers put in place a racial discourse of superior versus inferior
in order to maintain control.147 Race became a major vehicle to establish European dominance
over black Africa. Racism was necessary in establishing principles of innate and inherent
superiority.148 And racial discourse is apparent within the reporting of the genocide by Western
reporters, even so many years after decolonization and African independence.
In many instances, the media referred to Rwandans as “savages.” A 20 May Le Monde
report refers to a Rwandan as a “savage,”149 while a 9 April The Times article says that many
English think that Rwandans are “savages.”150 The American news media also falls prey to the
use of racial discourse. A 14 July New York Times article states “Rwanda’s torment underscores
the difficulty of stopping savage conflict.”151 By making the Rwandan into a savage, the Western
media holds true to the discourse of colonialism and European domination over Africa. By using
this word, the reporters become intertwined with this discourse and perpetuate Western notions
of superiority over Africa.
Two other colonial discourses can be seen throughout the reporting of the genocide. The
first is the sexual discourse of colonialism. Some scholars have begun the investigation into how
colonialism affects sexuality and vice versa. This area of scholarship came in the wake of the
cultural turn in historiography. The media’s use of sexualized language perpetuated the notion of
Western dominance. A 28 June The Times article states that “France’s Operation Turquoise
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yesterday, penetrated deep into Central Rwanda.”152 France’s penetration into the country exerts
Western dominance over the African nation. The Times continues the sexual discourse in an
article a few days later. In describing the safe zones that the French set up under Operation
Turquoise, there was “no penetration by armed units.”153 The use of the word “penetration,”
especially by the British news media, is significant to their colonial legacy. British reporters
show how former colonial powers have the ability to “penetrate” or regulate “penetration” within
an African nation even now that that nation is sovereign.
The discourse of paternalism is also prevalent throughout the media. A 9 April article in
The Times talks about how peacekeepers “cannot cure Rwanda’s blood frenzy.”154 By using the
word “cure,” the reporter shows that there is something wrong with Rwanda, something that
needs to be cured, essentially by the West. Later, The Times featured an article that describes
how the Hutu captives are being “reeducated.”155 Here, there is a need, for the West, to educate
Rwandans. This need for reeducation demonstrates again, how the Western world dominates
Africa and maintains superiority.
The reporters also demonstrate how colonial legacy plays a role on them by
misrepresenting the relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Because they are Africans, they
have always been doomed to violence and tensions. The best way this is exemplified is the
reporters’ portrayal of the genocide as a product of long-term conflict between the Hutu and the
Tutsi. Mahmood Mamdani, among other historians, argues that under colonialism, Hutu and
Tutsi emerged as state-enforced political identities. Before the arrival of Europeans, no strong
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examples of violence between the two groups existed.156 The media describe the problems
between the Hutu and Tutsi as rooted in “centuries old domination.”157 They were “rooted in
centuries old feuds between Rwanda’s majority Hutu and minority Tutsi ethnic groups.”158 This
over exaggeration of the relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi shows how the reporters are
a product of the larger discourse of African turmoil.

Conclusion
The use of Rwanda’s colonial history helped the media make sense of the genocide and
violence that was taking place in Rwanda in 1994. The discussions of the Belgian colonial legacy
and the French neo-colonial legacy demonstrate how the West is integrated into the violence.
The news media also put the situation in Rwanda into the context of the larger discourses of
colonial and neocolonial Africa, mainly the fate of Africa and the problems with democracy on
the continent.
But, the news media and the reporters themselves also fall prey to colonial legacies. The
reporters from all three countries are a part of the larger discourse of colonialism, whether they
meant to be or not. They perpetuated the legacies of Western dominance over African nations by
their word choices and verbal images of Rwandans and the situation in Rwanda. The Western
colonial legacy is ingrained within them and the reporters continue the ideas of Western
superiority through their reporting on the Rwandan genocide. The news reports from the time of
the genocide use colonialism in order to portray the genocide to the public, but they also use
those colonial legacies in order to make sense of the genocide within the Western world.
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Ultimately, the reporters of the genocide preserved the racism and dominance that they tended to
denounce.
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CHAPTER TWO: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
All three countries, France, Britain, and the United States, played a large role in
colonialism and still continue to influence the development of formerly colonized countries. But
these three countries also played a large role in another important development in the twentieth
century. In the wake of the Nazi Holocaust, the cry of “Never Again”159 spread throughout the
world. With the fall of Hitler’s Nazi regime in 1945 and the liberation of Occupied territory,
Allied forces unveiled to the world the horrors of what had taken place in Nazi ruled Europe
during World War II. In the end, the Nazis exterminated six million Jews and five million Poles,
Communists, Roma, and other “undesirables” within a matter of years.160 The world was in
shock. Something needed to be done to make sure that something of this magnitude would never
happen again. And from that, the modern human rights movement was born.
Defining what constitutes a human right is not easy, nor consistent. Essentially, human
rights are rights held by individuals simply because they are part of the human species.
Everyone, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, nationality, or economic background, share them
equally.161 But there has always been controversy with such a simple definition. While, some say
that human rights are universal, others argue that rights are a Western invention, created in order
to export a culture’s notions and impose them upon other cultures.162 The world has defined and
redefined human rights within contexts of political need, moral imperative, and local context
throughout their long history.163
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Such a complex understanding of human rights makes understanding the violations of
human rights complicated and ambiguous as well. Lynn Hunt states that: “the process had and
has an undeniable circularity to it: you know the meaning of human rights because you feel
distressed when they are violated.”164 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states
multiple offenses on human rights. The document defines the problems with slavery, torture, and
arbitrary arrest or exile against the institution of human rights among thirty other articles worth
of potential violations. The problem comes with how to deal with those violations. It is easy to
look at a situation and say that human rights, the right to liberty and freedom, was violated, but
there is a problem of how to adequately deal with those people or groups.
The debate between cultural relativism and universality complicates human rights
heavily. Princeton University defines cultural relativism as the principle that an individual’s
beliefs and activities should be understood by others in terms of that individual's own culture.165
This contrasts with the Universalist approach to human rights that promotes human rights as a
universal entitlement. The problem with cultural relativism in human rights legislation and
implementation is that many nations and leaders have abused the concept. Cultural relativism is a
“recurrent product of a historical failure to promote universal rights discourse in practice, rather
than a legitimate alternative to the comprehensive vision offered by a universal stand on
justice.”166
Cultural relativism became a way for Third World dictators and tyrannical governments
to justify murder, torture, and abuse within their sovereign nations.167 This complicates how the
United Nations and the international community decide and justify getting involved in certain
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circumstances, especially concerning the Third World. And concerning the Rwandan genocide,
cultural relativism played a large role due to how the West understood the situation in Rwanda
and their ability to interpret the situation correctly.
Cultural relativism made the genocide in Rwanda difficult for the West to understand and
interpret. But racial legacies of colonialism and the inert perpetuation of Western dominance
over Africa complicated matters even more. While the reporters sought to understand how
human rights legislation and implementation should be applied to Rwanda, often times, they also
turned made the genocide into the fault of the Rwandans themselves. The reporters maintained
Western ideals that delineated the genocide as a product of the natural order of things for African
nations. This perceived ineptness of Africa to dissolve into unrest influenced the reporters as
they sought to involve the genocide into international human rights policy.
This chapter will analyze how human rights responsibility was a complex phenomenon
during the genocide. Much like colonial legacies, human rights played a role in how the media
understood and interpreted who needed to intervene in Rwanda. But, also like the legacies from
colonialism, human rights legislation and protection during the Rwandan genocide was not clearcut and was highly contested between the media of the different countries. France, Britain, and
the United States role as protectors of human rights became tangled with their past experiences
and self-appropriated subjectivities.

The Birth of the Modern Human Rights Movement
The Western world was not new to the principles of human rights. In fact, some
historians claim that examples of human rights date back to ancient times, articulated by poets,
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philosophers, and politicians.168 Human rights first became prominent during the Enlightenment.
Philosophers and thinkers began to question both the Church and ancient Greek and Roman
authorities; world order began to be understood differently, thanks to scientific progress and the
wars of the Reformation. New discoveries opened the world to a better understanding of human
consciousness and developed secular and universal laws, rather than religious teachings and
supernatural explanations of human phenomenon.169
A pioneer of human rights during the Enlightenment was English philosopher John
Locke. He began the argument that an individual had the right to choose religion; that right did
not belong to the State. His call for a greater separation between Church and State opened a new
chapter in the struggle for religious freedom and freedom of opinion.170 Locke also argued, “the
autonomous male entering into a social compact with other such individuals was the only
possible foundation of legitimate authority.”171 For Locke, humans had natural rights and those
revolved around “’reciprocal’ liberty, ‘not a state of license.’”172 Locke allowed that people
would consent to monarchial government but it would be irrational to submit to absolute
arbitrary power. It would be impossible to consent to it because absolute arbitrary power could
not convey to another what they do not rightfully possess.173
Two countries took those teachings from revolutionaries like Locke and used them to
revolutionize their governments and societies. In the eighteenth century, France and the United
States became sovereign states. In mid-June 1776, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
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with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Happiness.” Jefferson, with this one sentence, turned the United States Declaration of
Independence into a long-lasting proclamation of human rights.174 Thirteen years later, the
French, during their own revolution, adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen
that stated, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”175 While these two
documents became the foundation for human rights understanding throughout the next two
centuries, they faced the same contradictions encountered by modern day human rights
legislation. When the language of human rights emerged during this time, that language lacked a
clear definition of rights.176
Ambiguity of human rights continued into post World War II legislation as well. On 10
December 1948, a majority of states adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in a
night session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Declaration was the culmination of
three years worth of negotiation and debate about how to implement a system to protect the
rights of people around the world. The UN proclaimed that the Declaration was a “common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.” Only the communist bloc, South Africa,
and Saudi Arabia withheld their endorsement.177 This Declaration was a drastic change from the
human rights politics of the eighteenth century; now the nation-state held responsibility for
protecting the rights of their citizens.178
The problem with this new human rights legislation, much like the legislation from the
eighteenth century, was paradoxes. Even for the creators of the legislation, a solid definition of
human rights was hard to pinpoint. “The human rights paradigm is resilient; one of its
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remarkable characteristics is the capacity to mean different things to different people while
retaining overall ideological coherence.”179 While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
solidified the protection of human rights, a huge difference remained between policy and
practice. While clean and organized, the Declaration contains many ambiguities in wording,
especially concerning concepts such as freedom and self-determination. It also lacks any
provision on how to enforce rights.180 “Human rights are easier to endorse than enforce.”181
Since 1945, political need and relevant context defined and redefined human rights.182
The problems with human rights legislation and implementation did not just stop with
that document. A changing world order and the relationship between the Western world and the
former African and Asian colonies shaped how the international community viewed their place
in the human rights entity. It also created an ideological tension, which is still ever present,
between the Western world and the newly sovereign nations. “The politics of anticolonialism
both advanced and obstructed the progress of international human rights.”183 One of the biggest
components of decolonization was the move toward self-determination by colonized peoples.184
Newly independent countries attempted to find their place in the world order and to legitimize
their recently found sovereignty. When the UN drafted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Africa and other colonized countries had no representation or input since, at that point,
they were only colonies.185 African and Asian countries joined forces with each other to solidify
their independence movements. The first major stride toward this non-aligned movement was the
Bandung Conference that took place in 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, during the beginning of the
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Cold War. Six independent African nations joined with almost all of Asia to create a human
rights agenda for decolonized states.186
This coming together of decolonized states, at first, alarmed the West. The West was
afraid of the creation of an anti-Western bloc and this new group might align with communism
under the platforms of racial solidarity and anticolonialism.187 But as long as the West was able
to maintain control in the UN, they were open to whatever the newly independent countries
wanted.188 The West also played a paradoxical role when it came to human rights protection and
decolonization. During this time, Western countries, mainly France and Great Britain, promoted
human rights while simultaneously putting down uprisings for independence in their colonies. 189
Sovereignty and the right to self-determination mainly concerned former colonized states
in the beginning. But that shifted over time. Slowly, the newly formed nations shifted toward
authoritarian control. The Proclamation of Tehran, given during the Tehran Conference in 1968,
set forth a hierarchy of rights that favored radical delegations and leaders. The state’s rights
gained primacy over the rights of the individual.190 This example not only shows how rights are
fluid, but also demonstrates the complexities of the relationship between the West and the Third
World. Essentially, at Tehran, the Third World “outgunned” the states of the West and did not
outwardly oppose this new application of rights.191 While cultural relativism remained ever
present, Tehran and the new human rights order that came out of it strengthened the theory. The
paradigm of human rights shifted from universalism to cultural relativism at least until the end of
the Cold War.
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Ironically, the West championed cultural relativism in the beginning. In the early 1950s,
in order to maintain control over their colonies, many Western powers argued for an exemption
clause for their overseas territories, which they argued on the basis of cultural difference.192 Once
states gained their independence, the West went back to support for universality. And by the
1970s, Third World countries dismissed civil and political rights as Western; universality was
deemed imperialist.193 And by the 1990s, many African and Asian countries codified cultural
relativism as their official ideology.194
Cultural relativism created a huge gap between the Western world that promoted
universality and those authoritarian countries in the Third World that championed relativism.
Current human rights debates show that African countries held different priorities when it came
to what needed to be protected. African notions of human rights tended to be more concerned
with the collective rather than the individual. Also, African notions of human rights formed a
hierarchy, where civil and political rights are not realized as long as social and economic rights
remain rudimentary.195 Cultural relativism were human rights and the difference in Western and
Third World thinking continues to cause problems. “The concept that relativists champion in
terms of respect for the Third World cultures had ended up providing a powerful excuse for those
who murder, torture, and abuse Third World people.”196 Problems between the Western World
and the Third World on human rights after decolonization show the complexity of protecting
ideas. Human rights are hard to protect when there is no common agreement on what rights need
to be protected.
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The end of the Cold War drastically changed human rights policy because “human rights
cannot be separated from political, economic, or cultural globalization.”197 The new surge in
information technology made human rights promotion easier and faster. Many NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) now offered websites that allow people to help fight the
cause in a few keystrokes. The role of the press became important in the human rights movement
because of the ability to move information quickly.198 But technology also widened the gap
between rich and poor countries that further strained the relationship between the West and the
Third World.199 This gap caused the West to seem “more omnipresent” which led to a more
forceful resistance by nationalists and those that favor cultural relativism.200
Human rights legislation has not followed an easy course since its implementation in
1946. Globalization brought changes and criticism to the UN and the rest of the Western World.
The 1990s saw the first global effort to enforce human rights when the UN set up courts to deal
with war criminals from Yugoslavia and Rwanda. These courts led to the creation of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998.201 But, the 1990s also became a “decade of
international apology politics.”202 Countries around the world began to offer official apologies
for past atrocities committed in order to reaffirm the legitimacy of their efforts to protect human
rights. But even with the outpouring of apologetic sympathy towards past wrongdoings, only five
years after the Berlin Wall fell, the international community, that had recently reaffirmed
protection of human rights, watched the Rwandan genocide happen.
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Responsibility
Since 1946, the international community has held a moral responsibility, bound by a
signed document, to protect against human rights violations. But, in 1994, the outside world
failed Rwanda when it came to upholding that responsibility. The media recognized this failure
almost immediately after the genocide broke out. The media criticized the international
community on their lack of intervention and lack of desire to protect human life. And when one
country finally did directly intervene in Rwanda, the media celebrated that intervention. The
media held the international community responsible for protecting human life and adhering to
their moral responsibility, even though upholding that responsibility is complex.

International Responsibility
“But for European groups, which will protect the Tutsi minority?”203 That question
appeared 21 April 1994 in L’Express, almost three weeks after the genocide began. The
international community played an important role in the genocide in Rwanda. It is a role known
for inaction rather than action. Rwanda gained sympathy from the international community but
also a “firm pledge to stay away.”204 Historians of the genocide repeatedly blame the
international community for taking a backseat to the genocide and ignoring the need for
intervention. The media from France, Britain, and the United States all recognized that the
international community had responsibility, under the Declaration of Human Rights, to protect
the Tutsi from humanitarian violations.
The outbreak of violence following the plane crash on 6 April 1994 should not have
come as a surprise to the international community. Historians of the genocide argue that the
international community and the United Nations knew prior to 6 April that the Hutu had already
203
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planned the massacres and executions of the Tutsi. Between 8 and 17 April 1993, Waly Bacre
Ndiaye, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions of the
Commission for Human Rights visited Rwanda and concluded that “serious human rights
violations were taking place and that there was a risk of genocide.”205 Ndiaye later commented
that, with the attention actually given to the report, he might as well have thrown it into the
sea.206 In January 1994, a United States government intelligence analyst stated that if conflict
restarted in Rwanda, “the worst case scenario would involve one-half million people dying.”207
And during that same time, the “Genocide Cable” written by Major-General Romeo Dallaire
notified the United Nations that the Rwandan government was training Interahamwe in camps to
kill Tutsi quickly. This cable went to all major Western countries, yet all chose to ignore the
signs it presented.208
These reports and cables were sent to the United Nations and the rest of the international
community while Hutu extremists armed for a massive extermination, right in front of the world.
UN peacekeepers in the country, prior to the genocide, commented that the Hutu government
created major weapons stockpiles around Kigali. The militia expanded as well. Invoices and
bank statements show that the Rwandan government made deals with many Western nations to
acquire mass amounts of machetes and other agricultural tools. The government purchased these
weapons in 1993 from Western donors under contracts that they would “not be used for military
or paramilitary purposes.”209 A CIA report from 1993 found that almost four million tons of
small arms were transferred to Rwanda from Poland, via Belgium.210 At the beginning of the
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genocide, the Hutu distributed an estimated eighty five million tons of munitions throughout the
country.
When the violence erupted in April, the international community looked on in disbelief
because they felt unable to act even though the Western world did have knowledge of impending
violence within Rwanda. In the first few weeks of the genocide, the media recognized that there
was a lack of actual action because the international community did not actually know how to get
involved; the situation was too incomprehensible to begin to know how to engage. A 23 July
article from The Economist stated “The disaster that has overtaken Rwanda is too big to
comprehend. But, that does not excuse inaction.”211 Rwanda was a “crucible full of explosives
that nations watching from a comfortable distance have no idea how to handle.”212 An article in
The New York Times, appearing just a week after the violence began, explained that the fighting
was just too intense within Rwanda and the international community could do little to stop the
violence.213 And after an effort was made to evacuate citizens of other countries, a Time article
stated that “the Western troops could barely manage to protect their own countrymen” and
therefore did not have the resources to cope with the Rwandans.214
The media highly criticized the removal of expatriates and juxtaposed it with the horror
of the situation with the Tutsi. “The killings take place casually, under the noses of UN, French,
and Belgian troops, within the range of television cameras, and just yards away from expatriates
being evacuated.”215 This juxtaposition became a criticism of the international community but
also an example of the severity of the violence going on. “But while they loaded Europeans on to
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planes bound for the airport, Rwandan corpses piled up along the routes.”216 The media’s
criticism of the removal of foreign personnel showed that the main priority for the international
community was their citizens, not the protection of Rwandan lives.
As the genocide went on, the media became adamantly more critical of the lack of
international intervention. An 18 June article in The Economist made the lack of effort an
embarrassment to the international community. The article explains that the African world had
come to the aid of Rwanda whereas the “rich world, to its shame, has not.” The article continues
by explaining the preposterousness of not even being able to effectively supply arms to the UN
forces within the country. A 18 June article from The Econimist stated “This is pathetic: It is
impossible to believe that an over-armed world, if it had the will, couldn’t find ready-to-use
armoured cars to spare, and get them to Rwanda quickly.”217 Desperation and anxiousness came
from the French press as well. “The Rwandan tragedy is not a tragedy of Africa, or at least not
only, but first and foremost, it is the bloodiest conflict of the late century, for which the duty to
intervene fell on humanity.”218 And the media emphasized how humanity failed to take charge of
their responsibility.
The international community had a responsibility to intervene in Rwanda and protect
human life, and the Western media recognized that fact. When one country finally did stand up
and intervene, the media offered praise and admiration.

The Case of France
Throughout the four months of genocide, the media remained critical of the international
community as a whole for their lack of intervention. But, the media from one major country
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celebrated their personal responsibility amid a world that shunned their own. The French media
celebrated French efforts in Rwanda and held their moral responsibility in high regard, especially
when compared to their Western counterparts. France has a long reputation of universalism when
it comes to Africa. Their relationship with Africa, both during colonialism and after
decolonization, kept the French involved in the continent and the French took on the role and
reputation as protectors of the continent.
France’s position as a protector of human rights is highlighted throughout the articles in
the French press. Many times, the media framed France as a paternal figure to Rwanda. France
had to “maintain its commitments and its responsibilities”219 because of their stance on human
rights violations. Operation Turquoise was a “mission entrusted to them.”220 The media
highlights the reaction of Rwandans when the French arrive. “And the kids sing in Kinyarwanda,
an unexpected serenade, ‘France brings us peace. Machetes and stakes can no longer kill.’”221 A
headline in Le Monde from June 26 following the start of Operation Turquoise reads, “Jubilation
among Hutus, relief among Tutsis.”222 Again, this suggests that France brings relief with them to
all people; therefore promoting France as a protector that is able to bring peace to the country.
The French media’s celebratory reporting of France has a lot to do with how France saw
their place in the international community, as a leader of the effort to protect human rights. In an
article in Le Monde, Alain Juppe, French Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, made the
statement, “’In any case, I feel that once again, our country takes its responsibilities and – if you
allow me this excess of immodesty – gives example.”223 In another article in Le Monde this
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theme is shown again. “France is in a close relationship with Secretary General Boutros BoutrosGhali to study the contributions of the international community to the normalization of the
situation.”224 By reiterating France’s position in the international community, the French media
celebrated their responsibility to intervene within Rwanda.
Within the first two months of the genocide, international action in Rwanda was
practically non-existent. It was not until Operation Turquoise that the Western world became
directly involved in the country. And while the French media highly celebrated their country’s
efforts, the international media also offered praise to France, at least at the beginning of the
mission. The American media paid homage to the French for intervention by making the French
seem like the most humane of the Western world. A New York Times report states that the French
needed to intervene because “their stomachs could not stand it anymore” and that it “should
embarrass Americans” because they have not followed the French lead.225 And as the Operation
continued, The New York Times continued to praise the French effort. “Grant France this much
credit for its armed intervention into the genocidal civil war” when there was an “inability of
Washington and the United Nations.”226
The British media also offered praise to the French in spite of the tensions that come
along with the Anglo-French dichotomy. Through the criticism, which mainly revolved around
the French relationship with the Habyarimana regime and the Hutu, the British media still
recognized that “the French have done more than anyone else to stop the slaughter.”227 And like
the American news media, the British media used French initiative to criticize their own lack of
action. An article in The Times highlights a quote from a French corporal in Rwanda. “’The
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British know nothing about food and everything about war. Our history teaches us to view them
with respect in this manner but we cannot respect people who will not come and stand by our
side when we are sent on a mission to save lives.’”228 The British media, much more than the
American media, does highly criticize the French and Operation Turquoise, but still, the media
recognizes that the French had at least made an effort at intervention.
The Western news media recognized that the international community had a
responsibility to intervene in Rwanda. France finally took hold of that responsibility and made an
effort at intervention with Operation Turquoise. The media portrayal of international
responsibility demonstrates that the Western world knew that something needed to be done. It
was a moral responsibility for the international community to stop humanitarian violations, but
still, the West did little to nothing. Recognition of responsibility by the media took a turn in the
media towards placing blame on others, and in one case, on their home governments, and mostly
on the United Nations. This turn in the media represents the complications of interpreting human
rights legislation.

Blame
A common trend throughout the media of all three countries was the theme of blame. The
media, at many times, took to identifying the faults of Western governments in their inaction.
This is especially true of the United States. The United States was the most vocal in rejecting
intervention and seeking to prevent others in aid efforts. But most of the blame from the media
was put on the United Nations as a whole. The media criticism of the United Nations and the
ability to place the blame on the collective, helped individual countries pass on their
responsibility concerning Rwanda onto the larger entity.
228
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This movement to place blame on the United Nations exemplifies how human rights
legislation and implementation can be precarious. While all three countries signed the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and sit as permanent members of the UN Security Council, all
three were willing to shift personal responsibility onto the collective. This leaves the question of
who actually is responsible for interfering when human rights are being violated. By placing the
blame on the collective, each country is able to leave their personal vendettas and relationships
with Rwanda out of the picture. The responsibility of intervention falls on the UN as a whole,
and single countries can absolve blame for inaction.

The Case of the United States
Just four days after President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, a New York Times
article shows exactly how the United States would take a stance on Rwanda. “The President
[Clinton] stressed to them the importance of doing everything possible to insure the safety of
Americans, and doing whatever we could – which frankly isn’t very much- to stabilize the
situation in Rwanda.”229 Early on in the genocide, it was clear that the United States would be
one of the more reluctant Western nations to get involved. And the Western media highly
criticized the contentions held by the United States, both from abroad and from the American
media as well.
The United States government held a special position when it came to the situation in
Rwanda. Just the year before, the United States lost eighteen elite troops in Mogadishu under UN
mandate on what had originally been deemed a peacekeeping mission.230 Somalia was arguably
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“the greatest military humiliation for America since Vietnam.”231 In the shadow of that event, the
United States was far from willing to get directly involved once the situation in Rwanda began.
“’Anytime you mentioned peacekeeping in Africa,’ one US official remembers, ‘the crucifixes
and garlic would come up on every door.’”232 Even before the genocide broke out, the United
States was wary of even acknowledging escalating violence within Rwanda. When the Defense
Department’s African affairs bureau recommended that the Pentagon consider adding RwandaBurundi to the list of potential trouble spots, the reply was “Look, if something happens in
Rwanda-Burundi, we don’t care. Take it off the list…Just make it go away.”233 The media from
all three countries, the United States included, criticized the Clinton administration’s hesitation
to get involved in another African conflict even as the violence and death tolls grew in Rwanda.
The media from Europe continually criticized the United States for their lack of
intervention and their desire to combat any UN intervention within Rwanda, especially the
French press. In the first few weeks, the British media recognized the importance of the United
States in achieving an involved international community. America did not need to be involved in
every UN mission but their reluctance with Rwanda “encourages others to copy its unsupportive
style.” And unfortunately “America is not among the committed governments.”234 The French
used Somalia to mock the United States’ precautions with involvement in Rwanda. The French
media accentuated this fear by the US and used it to the advantage of promoting French
initiative. “The United States, stung by their disappointment in Somalia (they lost 39 men), have
vowed not to set foot there again.”235 The L’Express journalists’ statistics on how many men
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were lost in Somalia make US fears seem invalid and a bit over exaggerated, considering they
lost on thirty-nine men.
The United States went further than just refusing direct intervention of American troops.
The United States government continually called for a reduction in UN support and intervention
efforts. Immediately after President Habyarimana’s plane crashed, the United States determined
that there was no benefit of a peacekeeping mission. On 15 April, the Clinton administration told
the Security Council that a peacekeeping effort served “no useful role” in the present situation.236
Washington demanded the withdrawal of peacekeepers mandated by the UN and then refused to
authorize UN reinforcements for deployment to Rwanda.237 Even as the situation in Rwanda
worsened, the United States still only pledged artillery and vehicles, but even those came with a
cost to the UN.238 Cooperation efforts of the United States concerning humanitarian intervention
did not come easily. President Clinton knew that involving American troops in another bloody
conflict in Africa could have deadly results, much like in Somalia, so once again, the United
States stood on the sidelines.239
The French media vocalized their disdain for the actions of the United States when it
came to cooperating with the UN. On 23 April, a report about how the UN planned to reduce
presence to a strict minimum stated, “Washington suggests a total abandon.”240 Le Monde
continued the criticism of the United States when it came to their relationship with UN
humanitarian missions later in June. “The timidity of the US against the Rwandan tragedy is
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consistent with their political participation of the UN abroad.”241 And later, when the French
were committed to Operation Turquoise, the media continued to criticize how the US did not
support any UN mandate. “France has committed difficult action in Rwanda. In any way she can
oblige, in any way it is assured success. Europe, despite a few exceptions, have not followed, the
US distant.”242
In turn, the British media remained mostly silent on their criticisms of the United States.
British criticism focused more on the United Nations as a whole. The French criticisms of the US
are deeply rooted in French ideology concerning the Anglo-French dichotomy. As Daniela
Kroslak says, the Anglo-French relationship is not so much “turned against the United Kingdom”
as it is a fear of “the undesirable spread of American influence on the African continent.”243 This
helps explains the French media attack on the United States and the fact that the media singled
them out.
The international community, including the media, highly criticized the United States
during the genocide. But the American media also offered criticism of their own country. But,
when criticism of the United States and their unwillingness for involvement appeared in the
media, the media always placed the United States within the larger context of the United Nations
and the rest of the international community. “Given the fact that there is no political will, either
in Washington or other capitals, to intervene, the American strategy is to keep expectations as
low as possible.”244 Comparing Washington to other capitals demonstrates how the American
media grouped the actions of the United States with others in order to avoid direct criticism.
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The memory of Somalia existed within the American media as well. “Somalia cooled the
impulse to rescue innocent victims.”245 When it came to Somalia, the media took its lead from
the United States government. One of the strongest voices on relating Rwanda to Somalia was
President Clinton. When asked about intervention into Rwanda, he replied, “Lesson number one
is, don’t go into one of these things and say, as the US said when we started in Somalia, ‘Maybe
we’ll be done in a month because it’s a humanitarian crisis’…Because there are almost always
political problems and sometimes military conflicts, which bring about these crises.”246 And the
media followed suit with the president. “But to enter this conflict without a defined mission or a
plausible military plan risks a repetition of the debacle in Somalia.”247 Time also vocalized how
Somalia affected the United States involvement in Rwanda. “The American appetite for such
missions, even in cases of dire human need has been dulled by experiences like Somalia.”248 The
ghosts of Somalia trickled into the American media as well as the American government.
As the genocide progressed into June and July, the media began to recognize that the
United States was at fault for some of the United Nations forebodings. An article of 15 June,
described the United States as the United Nations’ “leading deadbeat.”249 Two weeks later, in an
opinion piece, the author described the United States by stating, “We are the richest country in
the world. We are hanging around the UN bar, looking for a free drink and acting as if we are
buying the rounds on the house.”250 Even though the American media recognized that the United
States hindered the United Nations, the media from the United States, as well as from France and
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Britain, placed most of the blame, and responsibility, on the collective for intervention, the
United Nations.

The United Nations
The media from France, Britain, and the United States all follow a similar trend in the
reporting of the genocide. All three countries placed the largest blame on the United Nations for
the situation in Rwanda. Although all three countries hold permanent seats on the United Nations
Security Council, and therefore hold responsibility in the decisions of the United Nations, the
media from all three countries turned the attention onto the United Nations as a whole when it
came to action, or lack thereof, in Rwanda during the genocide. By focusing on the United
Nations as a whole, the media was able to shift the blame away from their home countries and
protect their image when it came to their responsibility of humanitarian intervention and the
protection of human rights.
The United Nations committed to Rwanda before the genocide began, at least halfheartedly. In August 1993, the Habyarimana government and the RPF signed the Arusha
Accords in Arusha, Tanzania. The Accords called to merge the Rwandan government and the
RPF. It called for a transitional government and a merger of the two militaries. Some considered
the Arusha Accords “one of the best deals negotiated in Africa.”251 The United Nations became
directly involved in Rwanda in 1993. On 5 October, the United Nations approved The United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The UN meant UNAMIR to be a
minimalist peacekeeping mission despite the fact that the situation in Rwanda was growing more
and more dangerous. UNAMIR was doomed from its inception. It was highly under financed due
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to the demands of the cost conscious United States.252 The mission was “run on a shoestring;” it
was equipped with hand me down vehicles from the United Nations mission in Cambodia and
when medical supplies ran out in March 1994, there was simply “no cash for resupply.”253
In the beginning on 1994, it was clear that the Arusha Accords were crumbling and
UNAMIR was in trouble. The United States argued firmly for a complete abandon of UNAMIR.
On 5 April 1994, the Security Council met to discuss the withdrawal or extension of the mission.
Unless there was going to be complete adherence from both sides to the Arusha Accords,
UNAMIR would be pulled out of the country.254 But just a few hours later, the genocide had
begun.
The media remained highly critical of the UNAMIR during the course of the genocide,
especially with the reduction of the mission. “UNAMIR should instead have a clear mandate to
stop the massacres, to disarm and to oppose all military forces which take hold of the civilian
population as targets on the basis of kill lists established a long time ago.”255 When UNAMIR
should have been reinforced, the UN voted to reduce it. On 21 April 1994, the Security Council
voted to drastically reduce UNAMIR and leave behind only a handful of UN peacekeepers that
were left helpless in an impossible situation.256 A New York Times article from April 22, just the
day after the Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR, stated “the symbolic force the Security
Council may be about to authorize would be a thin veil over another massacre.”257 And once the
Security Council reduced UNAMIR, “there [was] now no effective international force for ending
it.”258 The British media vocalized criticism of the reduction of UNAMIR as well. “[UN
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Peacekeepers] stand by helplessly as the killing goes on. They have a limited mandate, and are
only lightly armed; they cannot intervene in the fighting.”259 A Times article described the
situation as the “UN peacekeepers were merely on holiday.”260 While UNAMIR and the
reduction of it just when it was needed the most is highly criticized by the media, there is also a
large criticism of the United Nations as a whole and their inability to be effective in humanitarian
situations in general.
When the media mentioned intervention, they grouped responsibility under the United
Nations as a whole. Rwanda is the “moral responsibility” for the United Nations.261 And the
criticisms of the United Nations, at times, are quite harsh. “As to the UN, who cares about its
resolutions and its existence? It is just there, a pure formality, not to despair completely, to
believe that maybe one day something to come out of it would not be totally useless.”262
Occasionally the media grouped the failure with Rwanda with other failures by the United
Nations. “Mortification is painfully familiar to the United Nations these days.” The following
paragraph described all of the United Nations recently botched jobs such as Bosnia and Angola.
The article continued with “But never has the shame been sharper than in the past few weeks in
Rwanda…If it can do nothing in Rwanda, what is the world’s policeman able to do?”263 The
media also expressed sympathy for the Tutsi to contrast the lack of action by the United Nations.
“The best hope for the Tutsi is a victory by the RPF, not the United Nations.”264 An article in Le
Monde directly quoted a Tutsi in Kigali after the reduction of UNAMIR, “’Now that the Blue
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Helmets are about to leave, they will be able to kill us alone.’”265 The media remained very
critical of the United Nations and their actions throughout the genocide.
The international media also used the United Nations as a scapegoat for their own
country’s inaction. The United States media continually reiterated that the Clinton administration
is “wary” to put American troops at the hands of the United Nations for fear that they will not be
used properly.266 The New York Times also quotes State Department Spokesperson Michael
McCurry in the discussion of where humanitarian intervention will take place. “[It] will be under
review at the United Nations, and that’s appropriately the place where that discussion will
occur.”267 By continually shifting the United States responsibility of action into the hands of the
United Nations, the media was able to take direct responsibility away from the United States
government.
The French media also used the United Nations as an excuse for France’s inaction. The
media perpetuated the illusion that the United Nations purposely tried to block French initiative
within Rwanda. On 15 May, a report in Le Monde made it clear that France was willing to
respond to any request by the UN Security Council for intervention.268 Later, when France did
take the initiative to intervene with Operation Turquoise, the media ridiculed the UN for trying to
stop their plans. On 18 June, a front-page headline read, “The French project of intervention to
Rwanda hit with diplomatic obstacles.” The article that followed explains how the UN attempted
to stop any French initiative to aid in Rwanda.269 Those “diplomatic obstacles” refer to the UN
blocking French efforts to intervene within Rwanda.
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“So long as that is true, governments will increasingly dump problems in the UN’s lap
only when they want an excuse to do nothing.”270 The criticism of the United Nations by the
media of all three countries helps to contextualize the situation in Rwanda. By making the
genocide the United Nations problem, the international community escaped direct responsibility
for letting genocide take place. This shift in responsibility exacerbates the pitfalls of human
rights legislation within in the international community.

Conclusion
The Western media took two different approaches to the role of international intervention
during the Rwandan genocide. The media from all three countries recognized throughout the
genocide that the international community held a responsibility to intervene in Rwanda and
protect against humanitarian violations. And when intervention did happen, such as the case of
Operation Turquoise, the media celebrated the effort. But in response to the recognition of
responsibility, the media also turned the genocide into a blame-game. By pointing fingers at what
others were not doing, the media took the attention off of their own country. Or, in the case of
the United States, the media showed how the Clinton administration was to blame for the lack of
intervention by the international community.
The media’s reactions to international responsibility demonstrated how the Rwandan
genocide became more than just an isolated event. The genocide came to show the problems and
contradictions with human rights legislation and regulation in a world where human rights is
supposedly so highly protected. The long-standing problems with human rights legislation,
dating back to its inception, still existed in the Rwandan genocide. The problems with colonial
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legacies concerning racism and Western dominance, combined with the ambiguity of
international human rights legislation led to a confusing and complex environment that the
reporters attempted to make sense of in the summer of 1994.

64

CHAPTER THREE: THE TERM GENOCIDE

The term genocide, much like the concept of human rights, comes with much complexity.
The international community during the time of the genocide, from its start in April of 1994 and
even into the months following the official end in July, shied away from acknowledging that
genocide was taking place. The outside world portrayed the genocide as something else, “a
senseless civil war, a tribal conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, in which old conflicts and bitter
rivalries led to an almost primitive savagery.”271 For the international community and leadership
to call the situation genocide was an admission that they had a responsibility to intervene as
agreed upon in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The international community
acknowledged genocide only in order to attack other countries and governments and their lack of
inaction, or in order to glorify their own action in helping stop the genocide.
During the months of the genocide, the media took a critical yet sometimes complex
stance on defining the situation in Rwanda as genocide. Two stances emerged within the news
media during the time. Those two stances were the one that avoided the use of the word genocide
and the other which was neither afraid nor hesitant to call the situation in Rwanda genocide. The
emergence of two stances reflected the complexities of defining genocide and human rights in
general. These two stances comingled with each other during the months of reporting and often
times the position of the news source changed daily. The complexity and confused nature of the
reporting concerning the use of the word genocide reflects the larger issue of human rights
legislation. By defining the situation in Rwanda as genocide, or shying away from the term and
maintaining that the situation was a civil war, the media perpetuated the difficulty in how the
world understood, and still understands, human rights violations. And in turn, how the
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international community can protect against those violations.
The first stance that the media took shied away from the use of the word genocide and
reflected the views of international leaders. While media from all three countries remained quick
to describe the events in Rwanda horrifically and graphically to bring attention to the atrocities
taking place, the media portrayed those events as products of a civil war. This stance of the news
media acknowledged genocidal aspects, both outright and with word choice, but danced around
the actual use of the term genocide. With this, the news media was able to make the situation in
Rwanda more recognizable and familiar to the international community. Civil war is something
that the average newsreader could understand and familiarize with. Genocide is complex and
often inconceivable.
The other stance the media took sought to show the severity of the situation. This side of
the reporting used shock value. These reporters were willing to describe the horrors that were
taking place. They were willing to describe the bodies, the killings, and the mass graves. This
side of the media was willing to use the word genocide. They used graphic verbal imagery in
order to shock the reader, and perhaps initiate international action within Rwanda to stop the
violence.
Troops and humanitarian workers in the country continually put out visual images to
television media, but verbal imagery was also common within the written news media as well.
Romeo Dallaire knew the importance of the media in order to gain support for a relief effort. He
shuttled journalists and news reporters around Kigali whenever possible in the hopes that they
would relay the horrors to the public. “’At that point,’ he recalls, ‘the journalists were really all I
had.’”272 And those journalists did take those images that they saw and use them within their
reporting in order to make the public understand the magnitude of the situation in Rwanda. They
272
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used that imagery to describe the situation as what it was, genocide.
This outlook of the media also related the genocide in Rwanda to something very
recognizable to the international community, the Nazi Holocaust. By using language reminiscent
of the Holocaust, the news media made the situation in Rwanda more understandable to the
international readership. People knew the horrors of the Holocaust from education, books, and
movies, and could relate that knowledge to the events in Rwanda.
These two different stances, the one that recognized genocide and the one that shied away
from it did not exist in a vacuum. The media represented the larger complexities of human rights.
Not one media source remained true to solely one variation of the reporting. Especially, as time
went on, and as the violence escalated and the death toll rose, the media became much more
critical of the situation. The word genocide became much harder to shy away from, the severity
of the situation became harder to ignore. But, ultimately, the media’s multiple stances and
inconsistency demonstrate the problems with the use of the word genocide. They understood that
genocide was a loaded word, and the media, much like the international community, were not
entirely sure the appropriate time to use that word.

A History of the Term “Genocide”
Genocide, much like the concept of human rights, is a difficult word in terms of
definition. It is a term that has only existed since the 1940s. Even the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights does not mention the word genocide anywhere in its thirty articles. The word
genocide, like any other word, does in fact have a definition, but, like the term human rights, the
definition is fluid and changing to fit the needs of its user. Defining genocide is complex and
does not come with the best connotations. In essence, it is very controversial.
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The international community created the word after World War II. When the world
finally realized the full horror of the Holocaust, Winston Churchhill stated that the world was
being faced with a “crime that has no name.”273 Shortly after Raphael Lemkin, a Polish born
advisor to the United States War Ministry, in his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, published
in 1944, defined the Holocaust as “genocide.” The word derived from the Greek genos (race of
tribe) and the Latin suffix cide (to kill).274 He defined “genocide” as “a coordinated plan of
different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups,
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”275 He believed that “mass murder” did not
account for the motive behind such a horrific act therefore a new word had to be created.276 And
from its creation, the word was controversial. Many people had a hard time conceptualizing a
word that would describe such a horrible action.277
Lemkin’s term became law on 9 December 1948 when the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.278 This law stipulates a responsibility to try to prevent and protect against genocide
and to alleviate the suffering of genocidal victims.279 The text of the Convention does have many
shortcomings. For example, Article I, which pledges prevention of genocide, offers very little on
how to actually prevent genocide.280 The very definition of genocide is also disputed within the

273

Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, 2.
Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, 3.
275
Power, “A Problem from Hell,” 43.
276
Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, 3.
277
Power, “A Problem from Hell,” 43.
278
For the Convention’s full definition of genocide see Powers, “A Problem from Hell,” 57.
279
Kroslak, The French Betrayal of Rwanda, 2.
280
Kroslak, The French Betrayal of Rwanda, 11.
274

68

document.281 Because of these ambiguities, the term has become both very commonplace and
overused282 and also easily avoidable, as in the case of Rwanda.283
One of the first historians to focus on the situation in Rwanda, as a genocide, was Alain
Destexhe. In his monograph, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, published in 1995,
just the year after the Rwandan genocide, Destexhe calls Rwanda one of the “three genuine
examples of genocide during the course of the twentieth century” along with the Armenians by
the Turks in 1915 and the Jews by the Nazis during the early 1940s.284 Destexhe argues that the
term genocide has progressively lost its meaning through misuse and has become “dangerously
commonplace,”285 but the situation in Rwanda adequately follows Lemkin’s original definition
and meaning of the term.286 Even only a year after the genocide ended in Rwanda, Destexhe
realized the complications with deeming the situation in Rwanda genocide and acknowledged
that the international community failed to thoroughly explore the events in the country in the
scope of possible genocide.
Following suit, other historians and authors of the Rwandan genocide argue that the
situation in Rwanda was genocide. Historian Linda Melvern, in her seminal work, blamed the
international community by helping “create the conditions that made it [genocide] possible” in A
People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide.287 Other historians, such as
Mamhood Mamdani, have looked at the conditions that made genocide possible within the tiny
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African country; what made neighbor kill neighbor?288 There is also a trend in the historiography
of specializing on certain countries and their relationship to the genocide and how those different
Western countries understood the situation in terms of genocide and how they turned their backs
on Rwanda when it became obvious that genocide was taking place.289 These historians and
authors, as well as many others, recognize what happened in Rwanda as genocide and critically
analyze the situation and the international response in that manner.

Making the Situation Relatable: “Civil War” and Genocidal Implications
The first aspect of the media coverage of Rwanda mirrored the flawed interpretations of
the international leadership. This side of the coverage portrayed Rwanda as a civil war and
downplayed the genocide. In essence, this side of the media reporting tended to dance around the
issue by just focusing on the civil war that was taking place, relating the mass killings to
products of war. This stance of the media reflects the difficulties in recognizing human rights
issues and violations. Instead of acknowledging the genocide that was taking place, this side of
the media focused on the aspects that were easier to understand. The idea of civil war is not
uncommon when it comes to Africa. The public understands civil war and unrest in the
continent. It is easier to digest than something so monumental as genocide. By only focusing on
the civil war, this side of the media eliminated the confusion and uncertainness of what
constitutes genocide.
This side of the press coverage did little to help mobilization of responsive public
opinion. “There were no headlines about genocide. There were graphic reports about corpses
piling up on the streets and news stories about the scale of the killing, but there was little
288
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explanation in the commentary.”290 This side of the media went along with the idea that this was
tribal bloodletting and age-old conflict that was unable to be stopped by outside force. The first
international inquiry into the media reported that the media had failed to adequately report the
genocide and therefore gain public support and pressure on international governments for
intervention.291

Genocide versus civil war
Continually the news media referred to the situation in Rwanda as just a civil war. The
situation in Rwanda was indeed part a civil war. The Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Hutu
government were fighting a civil war for control of the country. But there are many instances
within the news media where the genocide became lumped in as just a byproduct of the civil war.
Casualties and death became just a result of the fighting. The news media did not recognize these
deaths as part of the genocide that the Hutu were waging on the Tutsi, but rather, as a product of
the civil war that the RPF and the Rwandan government fought.
The international leadership perpetuated the idea of Rwanda being merely a civil war
throughout the world. This misguided the international community in their responsibility to step
in and help save innocent lives. “Preoccupation with that [the civil war] blinded most
commentators, governments, the UN Secretariat and Security Council to the fact of the genocidal
killing perpetuated by one of the parties of the civil war.”292 Distinctions between the Rwandan
military and the Interahamwe, the Hutu killing squads, became blurred and the two were often
grouped together. Ultimately, confusion between the simultaneous civil war and genocide led to
hundreds of thousands of Tutsi to lose their lives as the international community looked on.
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And the media played an important role in grouping the civil war and the genocide into
one event. By calling the events in Rwanda a civil war, the media made the situation more
relatable to the public. Even when the reporters portrayed the violence as extensive, they also
tended to treat it as typical.293 The term genocide is easily confused and not an idea that is easily
understandable to the average newspaper reader. As seen above, the last real genocide that the
world has seen was the Nazi Holocaust and that was fifty years prior to the Rwandan genocide.
The Nazi Holocaust took place outside of the average newspaper reader in 1994’s lifetime or at
least memory. Civil war, especially when related to Africa, became much more understandable
and accepted in the international community in 1994. And while the imagery, both verbal and
pictorial, coming from all news media outlets was horrific and gruesome; the public understood
those images much better in the realm of civil war.
Throughout the media Rwanda is simply called a “civil war.” In a 1 May article from The
New York Times, Rwanda is a “civil war” and the article relates the violence to other countries in
which civil conflict has occurred.294 In a later article, the reporter referred to Rwanda simply as
“war-torn”295 and that is why the United States did not want to enter the country. Even at the end
of the genocide, New York Times reporters still perpetuated the reference. “The civil war in
Rwanda has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives over the last three months.”296 A 7 May
article in The Economist relates Rwanda to other African countries, stating, “African civil wars
are as hard to settle as any other.”297 And The Times began their coverage of the situation in
Rwanda by writing of how “the central African state lurched back into civil war” after the plane
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crash on 6 April.298 Later, the paper describes the dead as simply “victims of the civil war.”299
An article in The New York Times also discusses the victims in terms related to war. “An
estimated 100,000 to 200,000 people, mostly civilian, have been killed.”300 The term “civilian”
directly references war thereby relating the deaths with the civil war. By relating the deaths to
civil war, the media makes them no less tragic but much more relatable. The international
community understands civil war, especially in the context of the African continent.
This stance by the media does acknowledge the genocidal aspect of the situation in
Rwanda, it is often treaded upon lightly. Phrases such as “the stench of genocide”301
acknowledge what is happening in Rwanda could be genocide but avoided calling it genocide
outright. Many times, the news media states things such as “acts of genocide may have
occurred”302 or “the signs of genocide are everywhere.”303 Phrases and statements such as these
do give light to the severity of the situation in Rwanda while still keeping the newsreader
friendly and reader comprehensible.
Ironically, as the media shied away from defining the situation in Rwanda as genocide,
the news media continually criticized the international leadership for doing exactly the same
thing. In most cases, the country attacked is the United States. Official State documentation from
the Secretary of Defense dated 1 May sums up the Clinton Administration’s view on the use of
the word genocide. In a report, next to the definition of “Genocide Investigation,” a note was
made stating, “Be Careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday – Genocide finding
could commit [the U.S. government] to actually ‘do something.’”304 Throughout the months of
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the genocide, the Clinton Administration, more than any other international government or
organization, shunned the term genocide.
And the media was highly critical of the United States government for doing so, even
when the news media also turned away from direct use of the term. An 11 May article from The
New York Times states “Governments hesitate to call the horror by its name, for to do so would
oblige them to act.”305 Another article from 10 June criticized the Clinton administration because
they had instructed spokespeople to not use the word “genocide” because ending the killing
might not be worth American lives. The article later states “The Administrations cautious
language nevertheless mirrors the standoffishness the United States has adopted.”306 The British
media too attacked the United States government for their denial of genocide. “Mr. Clinton’s
administration had taken months before it would even admit that genocide had occurred.”307
The French news media criticized others in their denial and use of the word genocide.
Very rarely do the French papers studied deny that genocide is taking place within Rwanda. For
example, an article from 19 June puts forth that “no man of good can ignore the ongoing
genocide” in an article discussing how the United Nations is shying away from recognizing the
true nature of the situation in Rwanda.308 The French media also continually reiterated that the
United States “officials have been asked not to use the term genocide to escape obligation in
such case by the UN Charter.”309 The French media, whether as an act of self-promotion or
simply a strive for accurate reporting, coincides much more with the other stance taken by the
media.
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Shock Value: The use of verbal imagery and emphasis on genocide
Major media outlets, including the ones studied here, did continually describe the brutal
images coming out of Rwanda during the time.310 This stance by the media was not afraid to use
the word genocide, even with its murky and unclear implications. The use of verbal imagery, as
well as photographs, showed the horrific nature of the situation in Rwanda and made clear that
the situation was much more than just a civil war. A lot of this reporting began as more reporters
and journalists entered into the country and saw for themselves the severity of the situation. One
example is journalist Aiden Hartley of Reuters News Agency from Nairobi. He stated, “suddenly
the truth dawned on me that there was a mad logic about it. The point was not to win the war but
to wipe out the Tutsi,” after he witnessed massacres taking place within a church in Kigali.311
This paralleled with the United Nations realization of the difference between the
genocide and the civil war. It was not until the International Community of the Red Cross
(ICRC) issued a statement to the Security Council that stated the severity of the massacres on 29
April 1994. At that point Boutros Boutros-Ghali finally issued a letter to the Council President
demanding that “forceful action” take place in order to “restore law and order and put an end to
the massacres.” While he does not mention genocide outright, this is the first instance of the
Security Council separating the civil war and the massacres.312 It was not until 31 May that the
Security Council officially acknowledged Rwanda as genocide in a report based on information
from Iqbal Riza and Maurice Baril, the Secretary-General’s military adviser, which was gathered
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during a trip to Rwanda between 22-27 May. The report recognized the failure of the
international community and the United Nations in a situation of genocide.313
Besides the outright use of the word genocide, which can be seen throughout all of the
news media sources, the media used two other techniques to show the public the truth about the
situation in Rwanda. The media used verbal imagery in order to give the news about Rwanda
realism. By graphically describing events in Rwanda, the reporters evoked sympathy and outrage
from the public. Imagery made the horrors of the violence real. The media also used another
technique to show that Rwanda was indeed genocide. Reporters and journalists related Rwanda
to the most understood and recognizable genocide, the Nazi Holocaust. They related Rwanda to
Nazi Germany both outright and with the use of language that is reminiscent of the Holocaust.

The Use of Imagery
“God, no death is ok but to be killed like this, or to look like the living dead is
unbelievable.”314 This statement came from a French soldier in Rwanda under Operation
Turquoise. An article on 1 July from The Times states how “the tough French soldiers were
clearly unprepared for the scale of the slaughter they saw.”315 When the French did arrive in
Rwanda, they witnessed the extent of the situation. A report from The New York Times mentions
that French soldiers urged reporters to film corpses. One French soldier told The New York Times
reporter, “People need to see this.”316 Those that experienced the violence and death first hand
played a large role in passing along the actuality of the situation in Rwanda. They felt the need to
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show the outside world the horror of the atrocities that took place within Rwanda in order to gain
public support for relief efforts by the international leadership.
Even before the French arrived in Rwanda, images and reports of the severity of what
was happening in Rwanda flowed out of the country. One huge difference between Rwanda and
other genocides, such as the Holocaust, is that the killing in Rwanda did not take place in gas
chambers hidden from the public. The genocide in Rwanda took place on the streets and right in
the public eye. The Hutu did not hide their intent or action, often times killing Tutsi right in front
of foreigners and international relief. And radio stations, news networks, and the printed media
broadcast the killing. “The images of crude barbarity relayed across the world, the machete
attacks, the bodies floating down the river, corpses piled by the roadside, seemed to confirm the
atavistic nature of the killing.”317 The news media used graphic verbal imagery in order to relay
the severity of the situation in Rwanda and try and gain public support for intervention.
There are countless mentions of the magnitude of the violence throughout the news
media studied here. One trick that the news media used in order to make the violence more
relatable was to focus on single events or victims among the thousands. This technique made the
reader able to connect with the violence on a personal level. And many times, the articles
focused on women and children due to their reputation of vulnerability. An article in L’Express
focuses on sixteen-year-old Fred Mullisa “rotting in the swamp, feeding himself with grass. The
militias cut off his hand. A gaping wound on his right leg, swollen with gangrene. Fred speaks. A
thin voice out of this bruised body.”318 A Time Magazine article focuses on Rayontina
Mukansonera, a nineteen-year-old Tutsi girl that describes being raped repeatedly by the Hutu

317
318

Melvern, A People Betrayed, 5.
Vincent Hugeux, “Rwanda: la mort crie victorie,” L’Express, June 9, 1994 .

77

militiamen. “’They showed no mercy,’” she told reporters.319 These are just a few of the
multitude of stories focusing on women and children within the news media. The news media
was able to gain sympathy and attention by using the vulnerability of the women and children
victims.
The news media also used the verbal imagery of severed bodies and the multitude of
corpses in order to help the reader understand the magnitude of the situation. “There were too
many dead bodies: too many on the roads, too many corpses sharing beds with the living, too
many scattered among the banana groves.”320 A Time Magazine article describes “Severed heads
and limbs piled up on street corners, the smell of decay fouling the air. No matter how many
bodies Red Cross workers collected, more appeared.”321 Many times, graphic images of corpses
accompanied these articles, especially in the weekly periodicals. By describing the numbers of
bodies, and showing them as “piles” or in “mass graves,” the reporters are able to relay the
magnitude of the death that took place within Rwanda, and therefore garner public support.
The news media also used vivid verbal imagery of the Hutu militias. The descriptions
make the militiamen animalistic. The reporters dehumanized them in order to portray them as
barbaric. By dehumanizing the militiamen, the reporters were able to make their horrific deeds
understandable to the public because their acts were so unimaginable that people could not
fathom how humans could do this to one another. “And just round the corner, glassy-eyed,
hostile young men operate an impromptu road-block. Some wear the uniform of the Rwandan
army; many do not. They wield machetes, clubs or automatic weapons. They use them without
mercy or second thoughts, fuelled by cane liquor and banana beer, greed and tribal hatred.”322

319

Andrew Purvis, “All the Hatred in the World,” Time Magazine, June 13, 1994.
“Relief Operations for Rwanda’s refugees came almost to a halt,” The Economist, July 30, 1994.
321
Marguerite Michaels, “Streets of Slaughter,” Time Magazine, April 25, 1994.
322
“No end in sight: Rwanda,” The Economist, April 23, 1994.
320

78

An L’Express article stated “only youth militia, armed to the teeth, patrolling, set up roadblocks
when they are not needed for pillaging. Often drenched in beer, with bloodshot eyes, they are
unpredictable.”323 The militiamen are made out as bloodthirsty animals in order for the
international public community to hate them and garner support for international intervention.
And the media’s use of imagery did have its effect on the public. The news media from
all three countries acknowledged that the images coming from Rwanda moved the public. “The
public, seeing horrors on its television screen, feels strongly that someone ought to do something
when thousands of people are being killed or are starving to death.”324 Pictures and imagery
coming out of Rwanda also pushed the international public to donate money for aid reliefs. An
article in The Times focused solely on how harrowing pictures touched British hearts and purses
and there were large donations being made to relief organizations.325
By the end of the genocide, public opinion had affected international effort. “In April,
when the disaster in Rwanda was already in the making, the United Nations did little and the
Western powers, nothing at all.” But at the end of the genocide, the West was vying to do all it
could because “people have seen the pictures, and want action to be taken.”326 Images and
imagery caused public outrage when it came to the situation in Rwanda. Public opinion toward
the United Nations and international governments at the end of the genocide was very
unfavorable and outraged that the Western world could sit back and watch genocide unfold
before their eyes.
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Relation to the Holocaust
Besides the outright use of the word genocide, the media also used the best-known
genocide as a source of comparison. The term genocide came out of the Nazi Holocaust during
World War II. So it is only expected that the Rwandan genocide become contextualized within
that frame. “The Tutsi were killed as a group, recalling German designs to extinguish the
country’s Jewish population. This explicit goal is why the killings of Tutsi between March and
July of 1994 must be termed ‘genocide.’ This single fact underlines a crucial similarity between
the Rwandan genocide and the Nazi Holocaust.”327 There is a contrast with the Holocaust and the
Rwandan genocide that makes their relationship much more gruesome and inexcusable from the
standpoint of the international community’s lack of intervention. “But, unlike the Holocaust, far
from trying to conceal what was happening, the killing took place in broad daylight.”328 The
media relating the Rwandan genocide to the Holocaust and the methods used in the Holocaust
help contextualize the situation in Rwanda as genocide.
Within the news media, there is some direct comparison to the Holocaust. But mostly, the
media uses the language and wordage that is most commonly associated with the Holocaust.
Words such as “extermination” conjure images of the Nazi Holocaust and have been popularized
by seminal works in Nazi historiography. Calling the Hutu “executioners” and describing the
killings as “executions” also helps visualize the situation in Rwanda in terms of the Holocaust.329
The use of verbal imagery was also effective in the media representation of Rwanda as another
Holocaust. Descriptions of mass graves and concentration camps stir up the memories of the
Nazi Holocaust.

327

Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 5.
Melvern, A People Betrayed, 4.
329
Here I am referring to the popularization of Nazi “executioners” by Daniel Goldhagen and his seminal work
entitled Hitler’s Willing Executioners.
328

80

The media recognized the systematic nature of the killing in Rwanda of the Tutsi, much
like the Jews by the Nazis. A New York Times article from 3 June described the death of Tutsi as
a “campaign to exterminate” and stated, “they [Tutsi] were methodically hunted down.”330 Time
Magazine recognized early on the ethnic quality to the murders. An article from 25 April
mentions that “many of the 20,000 victims died simply because they were Tutsi.”331 Murder
based on ethnicity or race relates directly with how the Holocaust unfolded. And while the
American media recognized these comparisons to the methodology of the Holocaust, the United
States government continued to deny the genocide was taking place.
The British media also continued the imagery of the Holocaust within the reporting. An
Economist report from 21 May described “mass graves” and “Hutu death squads” in an article
that opens with the statement, “The signs of genocide are everywhere.”332 In the following issue,
a reporter states, “this was no spontaneous explosion of tribal violence, but a calculated attempt
to get rid of an entire people.”333 The daily British media also acknowledged the relation to the
Holocaust. As early as April, just three weeks after the genocide began, The Times recognized
that “an extermination” was taking place.334 And throughout the articles during the months of
violence, The Times reporters make references to such things as “concentration camps”335 and
the Tutsi looking like “the living dead.”336 The Times even went as far as to mock the
international community’s promises made after the Holocaust in a 4 May advertisement titled
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“Never Again?”337 The British media, out of the three Western nations, was the most liberal with
the term genocide and the relations between Rwanda and the Nazi Holocaust.
The French media also used the relationship between the Rwandan genocide and the Nazi
Holocaust to describe the situation in Rwanda. And the French had a unique position on the topic
because they had French troops on the ground during the genocide under Operation Turquoise.
L’Express described “mass graves”338 and often times featured photography of those graves. The
killing was often times described as “execution” and stories of Hutu “executioners”339 and “death
squads”340 ran throughout the articles featured in the news magazine. Le Monde also perpetuated
the language of genocide by the usage of words such as “extermination”341 and featured ads
within the paper entitled “Help Rwanda” which discussed “methodological extermination plans”
and “kill lists.”342 The French had a unique role in the situation in Rwanda due to their past
relationship and Operation Turquoise, but their media followed suit with British and American
media when it came to contextualizing the situation in Rwanda with the Nazi Holocaust.

Conclusion
The term genocide in reference to Rwanda was, in itself, controversial. That one word
determined and justified international response and action in Rwanda during those four months.
The media took on a complex role when it came to the idea and implementation of reporting
Rwanda as genocide. Two stances emerged within the reports. The first followed along with the
international leadership. This side did not use the word genocide and instead focused on Rwanda
as a civil war. By calling the situation in Rwanda a civil war, made Rwanda more relatable to the
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public readership. This side of the media was the side that wanted to leave Rwanda alone and
stay uninvolved, much like the Western powers.
Luckily, there was another stance of the media that was present during the genocide in
Rwanda. And that side was not afraid to call the situation in Rwanda by its rightful name.
Besides outright using the term genocide, this side of the media also portrayed the horrors of
Rwanda with vivid imagery and graphic description, even relating it to the most recognizable
occurrences of genocide. This side of the media was able to sway public opinion and create a
public force that demanded for intervention and action by the international leadership. And,
within the news media studied, this side of the media overshadowed the side that denied
genocide.
The fact that two different sides of reporting came out during the Rwandan genocide
mirrors the larger problems with understanding genocide, and human rights. Because the concept
of human rights is fluid and hard to define, genocide and response to it are complex. The
Western world had a reason to shy away from outright proclaiming Rwanda as genocide.
Deeming the situation genocide would have required international action and response. But even
defining genocide just to label a situation is tricky and complex due to the ambiguity of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights legislation. And the media fell
prey to that and demonstrated the complicated nature of protecting human rights.
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CONCLUSION

On 18 July, the last Hutu stronghold fell to RPF troops and the civil war was declared
over. But, the country was in shambles. In Kigali, an estimated 50,000 people remained from a
pre-genocide population of 300,000, and over half of those that remained had been displaced.
And their conditions were disastrous. The perpetrators of genocide had ransacked the entire
country. There was no clean water, no medical supplies, and few adequate food sources. There
was also the problem of rotting bodies piled throughout the country.343 In the months following
the genocide, the media attention concerning Rwanda turned to the refugee problem. As the RPF
gained control of the country, the Hutu fled in fear of retribution. Over two million Hutu crossed
into the neighboring countries of Congo and Tanzania in the final days of the genocide and the
first days of the Kagame regime.344 The media focused heavily on the worsening conditions in
refugee camps and the outbreak of disease. The refugee crisis in itself was a humanitarian
nightmare adamantly covered by news sources.
It was not until the years following the genocide that the international community began
to come to terms with the Rwandan genocide. In 1998, United States President Bill Clinton
visited Kigali. During a speech given to genocide survivors at the Kigali airport on 25 March,
President Clinton stated,
The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of
responsibility for this tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing
began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe haven for the
killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.345
Six weeks later, in a speech directed at the Parliament of Rwanda, United Nations Secretary
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General Kofi Annan stated,
Rwanda's tragedy was the world's tragedy. All of us who cared about Rwanda, all of us
who witnessed its suffering, fervently wish that we could have prevented the
genocide…We will not deny that, in their greatest hour of need, the world failed the
people of Rwanda.346

International guilt continued years after the genocide ended. The genocide still heavily affects
Rwanda and the international community into the present day.
The summer of 2014 marked the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide. All the
media sources analyzed above featured commemorative pieces about the event. While those
articles fall outside the scope of this thesis, their adherence to commemorating Rwanda
demonstrate how the Western world is still engaged with the genocide. The Western media
played a very important role during the summer of 1994 in bringing the genocide to the public.
The Rwandan genocide happened in an age of technology, where the international community
could be directly engaged in the action. The way the media portrayed the genocide influenced
how the international public understood and contextualized such a horrific event.
The media from France, Britain, and the United States did vary by country. For instance,
the British media was much more liberal with the term genocide whereas the American media,
for reasons of their own, shied away from it. The French media used their accomplishments with
Operation Turquoise in order to bolster the country’s psyche while other countries’ media
pushed their responsibility onto the shoulders of the UN as a whole. But, while each country’s
media differed slightly, the media sources from all three countries shared larger themes.
Larger issues heavily influenced the media from all three countries during the months of
the genocide. Those larger issues – the legacies of colonialism and the complexities of human
rights – were woven into the media reports on Rwanda. The legacies of colonialism helped
346
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reporters define the events taking place within Rwanda in a larger context that made those events
understandable. Rwanda is not a country ridden of its colonial past, and the Western reporters
used colonial and neo-colonial connections to interpret and portray the reasons behind the
genocide and civil war. The reporters themselves also became part of the larger colonial
narrative by perpetuating the notion of Western dominance over Africa through the use of racist
language and imagery. They perpetuated the racism that they claimed to reject. The reporting
also shows how complicated the issue of colonialism remains even years after decolonization.
The Rwandan Genocide envenomed the problems between the Western world and formerly
colonized countries.
The Western media also exacerbated the difficulties and intricacies of human rights
legislation and implementation. The complicated nature of allotting blame and assigning
responsibility by the media demonstrated how fluid the responsibility of human rights protection
is upon the world stage. The media used human rights protection both as a badge of honor and as
ammunition in regard to the need for intervention. Part of this multifaceted entity became the use
of the word “genocide” by the Western media. Often times, the Western media, like the
international leadership, met difficulties and ambiguities in using the loaded word. The word
genocide equates responsibility. The word within the media became both a source of denial and
reckoning. The Rwandan Genocide demonstrated the complex nature of human rights protection
within the media and the international community.
The media sources examined in this thesis demonstrate how the Rwandan genocide needs
to be understood in the larger context of the West’s relationship with Africa. In order to
understand and aid in future conflicts on the African continent, the West needs to acknowledge
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the larger issues of racial legacies and ambiguities of international human rights legislation. In
doing so, the Western world may be able to save millions of innocent lives.
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